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TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNANCE 
PRINCIPLES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL 
PROTECTION BENEFITS: COMPARATIVE LESSONS 
FROM DUTCH AND AMERICAN EXPERIENCES 
Frans Pennings* and Paul M. Secunda** 
The purpose of this article is to introduce a new approach to social 
protection benefit provision through an analysis and comparison of two 
of the advanced benefit systems in the world. Both the Dutch and 
American examples teach us that meaningful social benefit protection is 
possible, consistent, and necessary within market-based societies. 
Our recommendation is that advanced-market societies start a 
discussion on social protection benefits based on the dual principles of 
federalism/subsidiarity and fiduciary duty. Federalism provides that 
the national/federal government should provide the principles and 
minimal framework for benefit provision, while regional authorities, 
employers, and insurance companies should be given freedom, and the 
duty, to implement the underlying schemes to meet the challenges of the 
local situation. However, to constrain the sometime self-interested and 
conflicted motives of employers and insurance companies in the benefits 
system, we also suggest that countries adopt, at the national level, 
fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to protect against abuse, 
discrimination, and arbitrary action in the provision of such benefits. In 
addition, these principles should also be applied to employer-sponsored 
schemes in both countries, to the extent that such duties do not already 
exist. 
We hope, and believe, that through the construction of such a social 
benefit system, countries can guarantee a minimal level of benefit 
protection that will help their citizens negotiate difficult times during 
retirement, disability, sickness and injury, and unemployment. In turn, 
the "benefit" of such a system will be the recognition of the dignity and 
self-worth of all individuals, which is a non-ideological goal that we can 
all embrace. 
 
* Professor of Labour Law and Social Security Law, Utrecht University, Netherlands 
and guest professor at Gothenburg University, Sweden.  
** Professor of Law, and Director, Labor and Employment Law Program, Marquette 
University Law School. We are grateful to Zachary Mesenbourg for his exceptional 
research, writing, and editorial assistance on this article.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Social protection benefits include retirement, disability, 
unemployment, sickness, and healthcare benefits.  In Western 
Europe and the United States, these benefits have developed 
both symmetrically and asymmetrically.  Some historical factors 
that influenced the systems were basically the same: the 
Industrial Revolution led to a demand for dependent workers; 
because of their dependency, protective measures had to be 
taken, otherwise mass poverty threatened.1  Another important 
development was the crisis of the 1930s that led in the next 
decade to the conviction that society should be free from want 
and poverty.2  This idea was first realized in the United States, 
with the federal Social Security Act,3 but was also adopted in 
Europe where, during the Second World War, blueprints were 
adopted for a better society after war.4 
There are also important differences.  In the Netherlands, 
as a result of the involvement of Christian Parties in the 
government and Parliament, there is a general principle that 
ensuring a sufficient income for living is a public concern,5 
whereas in the United States, the focus has been much more on 
individual responsibility.6  This difference in approach to social 
protection systems can still be clearly seen today.  At first 
glance, a comparison of one European and the American system 
would therefore not appear to be very fruitful, but an initial 
analysis that the authors completed during a conference three 
years ago at Gothenburg University in Sweden persuaded them 
to undertake an in-depth comparison. 
In short, Western European and American social protection 
 
 1.  Abe Bortz, Historical Development of the Social Security Act, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN. (Sept. 21, 2014), http://www.ssa.gov/history/bortz.html; David N. Jones, 
International Social Work and Social Welfare: Europe, ENCYC. OF SOC. WORK (June 
2013), 
http://socialwork.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199975839.001.0001/acrefo
re-9780199975839-e-568?rskey=EaHAmf&result=1. 
 2.  Bortz, supra note 1. 
 3.  Arthur J. Altmeyer, Social Welfare in The United States, SOC. SEC. HISTORY, 
www.ssa.gov/history/aja964.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  National Reform Programme: The Netherlands 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/nd/nrp2013_netherlands_en.pdf. 
 6.  What is Social Security? NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., 
www.nasi.org/book/export/html/159 (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
PENNINGS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:30 AM 
2015]ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFITS 317 
benefit systems have important elements in common: (1) the 
risks against which they seek to provide protection, (2) the 
benefits provided by the system, and (3) the principles 
supporting these social protection programs.  Similarly, these 
systems have many challenges in common, specifically the 
increasing greying of their populations and the need to ensure 
adequate access to minimum retirement, disability, 
unemployment, sickness, and healthcare income.  There has 
been a move to include more private actors in the social 
insurance systems in both Western Europe and the United 
States, with mixed success being experienced for different 
reasons.7  As a result, the authors believe a more in-depth 
analysis comparing these different systems would be fruitful in 
aiding an understanding of the development of these programs, 
as well as providing important lessons about one another’s social 
protection benefit experiences. 
In this comparison, the authors will primarily deal with a 
major question for organizing social protection by law: Who is 
responsible for the provision of benefits?  This approach enables 
us to compare different systems because it leaves open whether 
and how a particular risk should be protected.  The answers to 
this question then allow us to compare how these issues are 
addressed in Western Europe, specifically in the Netherlands, in 
contrast to the United States. 
We will investigate major parts of the Dutch system with 
those of the United States, focusing on provisions made for 
protection of retirement, disability, unemployment, sickness, 
and healthcare benefits.  We conclude that some programs are 
better provided at the national level, while other programs are 
more suited for local or regional treatment.  Additionally, we 
conclude that some social protection programs are better 
provided by public bodies alone, while other programs can 
benefit through various forms of private actor participation.  
Finally, we embrace the ideas of federalism and subsidiarity on 
the one hand, and fiduciary duty on the other. 
Federalism provides that the national government should 
provide the principles and minimal framework for benefit 
 
 7.  See generally FRANS PENNINGS, THOMAS ERHAG & SARA STENDAHL (EDS.), 
NON-PUBLIC ACTORS IN SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, A COMPARATIVE STUDY 
(Kluwer Law International, 2013) (discussing in a series of countries, including the 
United States, whether non-public actors have a role to play in the administration of 
social protection benefits). 
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provisions,8 while principles of subsidiarity provide that regional 
authorities, employers, and insurance companies should be given 
freedom, and the duty, to implement the underlying schemes to 
meet the challenges of the local situation.9  However, to 
constrain the sometimes self-interested and conflicted motives of 
employers and insurance companies in the benefits systems in 
both countries, we suggest that countries adopt, at the national 
level, fiduciary duties of loyalty and care for benefit 
administrators to protect against abuse, discrimination, and 
arbitrary action in the provision of social protection benefits. 
This paper is divided into six Parts.  Part II discusses the 
social protection benefit system in the United States.  Part III 
undertakes a similar analysis of the Dutch system.  Part IV then 
draws out some important similarities and differences between 
the two systems.  Part V considers different dimensions through 
which it is possible to find unifying themes between the Dutch 
and American social protection systems.  Part VI concludes by 
proposing that retirement, disability, unemployment, sickness, 
and healthcare benefits be provided based on principles of 
federalism and subsidiarity and fiduciary duty, or through 
national governments with local assistance from regional 
authorities, employers and insurance companies.  On the other 
hand, to combat self-interested motives of private actors, we 
recommend that national fiduciary standards of loyalty and care 
be implemented to make benefit provision more consistent with 
individual self-worth and dignity. 
II. SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFIT SYSTEM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Social protection benefits in the United States evolved over 
time and were shaped by important historical factors.  
Throughout the colonial period, support for those in need 
revolved around the concept of community responsibility (where 
the poor relied on the community itself to help them through 
difficult times, rather than public institutions).10  By the mid-
1800s, Americans started requesting a form of public welfare; 
 
 8.  Altmeyer, supra note 3. 
 9.  David A. Bosnich, The Principle of Subsidiarity, ACTON INST. FOR THE 
STUDY OF RELIGION AND LIBERTY, http://www.acton.org/pub/religion-liberty/volume-
6-number-4/principle-subsidiarity (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
 10.  Bortz, supra note 1. This system worked fairly well at the time given that 
territories were not expansive and communities were tight knit, making it easy for 
people to support each other. Id. 
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the response came in the form of “custodial institutions” for the 
poor, insane, criminals, etc.11 
The Industrial Revolution became the most formative and 
influential factor in the development of modern social protection 
benefits in the United States.12  The Industrial Revolution led to 
income dependence: People now had real responsibilities to both 
procure and maintain jobs, or face the consequences of not being 
able to provide enough for their families.13  As the number of 
Americans (or workers) unable to support their families 
increased, backing for a true public welfare system grew, and 
the concept of a bureau for public welfare emerged.14  Public 
opinion shifted, there was more “recognition that poverty was 
often attributable to social inequities rather than personal 
defects.”15  All of these shifts helped shape the structure of the 
current American system. 
In the United States, the basic social protection programs 
are run predominantly by the federal (national) government,16 
with some important exceptions for each type of social protection 
program where states and private actors also play a role.17  On 
the other hand, government actors, as opposed to private actors, 
play the predominant role in the administration and 
implementation of these programs.18 
 
 11.  Id.  
 It appears that the post-Revolutionary War generations were far 
more prepared than their predecessors to assign a larger share of 
responsibility for dependent behavior to the structure of society 
itself rather than to individual idiosyncrasy, choosing to locate in 
existing social arrangements the essential causes of the problem. 
As they viewed it, American society was so open and 
unstructured—filled with limitless opportunities for achievement 
and vice—and its members so inadequately prepared to cope with 
it—since neither church nor school, nor, above all else, family 
provided the necessary discipline—that poverty, crime and 
insanity threatened the welfare of the new republic.  Id. 
 12.  See id. (examining triggers during the revolution that helped shaped social 
security policy, such as cities growing too fast with millions living in poverty, 
exploitation of minorities, and rampant unemployment). 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See id. The idea for such a bureau started in Kansas City in 1910. 
 15.  Id.; but see generally Colleen E. Medill, The Individual Responsibility Model 
of Retirement Plans Today: Conforming ERISA Policy to Reality, 49 EMORY L.J. 1, 5-
9 (2000); Edward Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 
471 (2004) (discussing individual responsibility model in employee benefit law 
context).  
 16.  Altmeyer, supra note 3. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Organizational Structure of the Social Security Administration, SOC. SEC. 
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As an initial matter, it is important to point out that the 
term “Social Security” in the United States refers to the 
government-run insurance program for older and disabled 
Americans.19  The term was first used when Congress passed the 
federal Social Security Act in 1935.20  Shortly after World War 
II, it became popular in Europe, introduced by the Beveridge 
Report that had the term “social security” in its title.21  This 
means—maybe somewhat remarkably—that Europe inherited 
the term from the United States.  Still, it has an entirely 
different meaning in the United States than in Europe (where it 
generally refers to all schemes covering social risks).22  In the 
United States, pension and disability benefits are defined by 
federal Social Security statutory law, while all states have their 
own public sector pension statutes and a few states have state-
provided disability plans.23 
In addition to Social Security, a large segment of the 
American populace receives employer-provided retirement and 
welfare benefits either under collective bargaining agreements 
or, more likely, through the unilateral and voluntary actions of 
employers (spurred on by vast tax subsidies for sponsoring such 
benefit plans).24  The federal Employee Retirement Income 
 
ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/org/orgdco.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
 19.  See History FAQs, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/hfaq.html 
(last visited April 21, 2015) (“The Social Security Act was signed by FDR on 8/14/35. 
Taxes were collected for the first time in January 1937 and the first onetime, lump-
sum payments were made that same month. Regular ongoing monthly benefits 
started in January 1940.”). 
 20.  See NEVILLE HARRIS, SOCIAL SECURITY IN CONTEXT 14 (Oxford University 
Press, Inc. 2000) (“This term indicated a broad view of the objective of state support: 
from one which was conditional on insurance, and thereby restricted to workers, to a 
system of social protection for all in poverty and need.”). 
 21.  See generally WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED 
SERVICES, BEVERIDGE REPORT, (H.M. Stationery Office 1942), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/19_07_05_beveridge.pdf (providing a 
blueprint for post-war social protection system in Europe). 
 22.  See generally infra Part III (on the Dutch Social Protection Benefit System 
in the Netherlands). 
 23.  See, e.g., ST. OF CAL. EMP. DEV. DEP’T, http://www.edd.ca.gov/disability/ (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2015) (providing an overview of California’s state-provided disability 
plan, which acts as a partial wage-replacement insurance plan). 
 24.  See Dustin Mineau, The 401k is a Government Subsidy for Wall Street, 
DAILY KOS (Sept. 27, 2012, 1:32 PM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/09/17/1132891/The-401k-is-a-Government-
Subsidy-for-Wall-Street#.  Employers get tax deductions and or credits for the 
creation of a 401k plan, as well as additional benefits for matching an employee’s 
contributions.  Id. 
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Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)25 provides rules for the provision of 
such benefits, including rules for the protection of certain forms 
of pension funds from forfeiture.26 
The American Social Security system is funded on a pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) basis and takes the form of a defined benefit 
plan.27  After employers and employees pay into the program, 
during the employee’s working life, the employee begins to 
receive a defined retirement benefit after she reaches a 
designated retirement age (which can vary based on the 
individual’s wishes as to when she or he wishes to start receiving 
benefits).28  This program in its current form, after some futile 
attempts to introduce privatization, remains bereft of private 
actors, and is run completely by the Social Security 
Administration, which is an independent federal agency.29 
The rest of this Part considers the four major American 
social insurance schemes: (1) the old-age, survivor, and disability 
insurance program under Social Security; (2) the unemployment 
compensation system; (3) the Family and Medical Leave Act 
(FMLA)30 for sickness and family leave; and (4) with regard to 
healthcare, both the public Medicare and Medicaid health 
insurance systems, as well as the private health insurance 
 
 25.  29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (2012). 
 26.  See Health Plans & Benefits: Employee Retirement Income Security Act – 
ERISA, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015) (explaining plan requirements that all participants must 
abide by). 
 27.  See NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS., supra note 6 (describing how today’s current 
workers pay into the system with money flowing back out to current beneficiaries 
knowing they will receive a similar benefit once they reach retirement age). 
 28.  See Retirement Planner: Benefits By Year Of Birth, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/retire2/agereduction.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). A 
person can start receiving Social Security Benefits as early as 62 or as late as 70.  Id.  
But if someone chooses to start receiving payments early, the benefit is reduced 
fractions of a percent for each mother before full retirement age.  Id. 
 29.  See Kathleen Schlach, Bush Eyes Privatizing Social Security in Second 
Term, NPR (Nov. 11, 2004, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4164384 (stacking up 
President George W. Bush’s three proposed social security reform models, all of 
which failed to gain any traction); see also James K. Glassman, Moynihan’s Social 
Security Plan, WASH. POST A19 (Mar. 24, 1998), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/politics/special/security/stories/oss040898.htm (outlining Sen. Daniel Patrick 
Moynihan’s (D-N.Y.) proposal to change Social Security by cutting the payroll tax so 
that Americans could use the money for their own private retirement accounts); 
Social Security in the United States, INFOPLEASE.COM, 
http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/society/social-security-in-united-states.html. 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
 30.  29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012). 
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system under the Affordable Care Act (ACA).  Part A. discusses 
pensions and disability insurance under the federal Social 
Security program.  More specifically, this section considers why 
privatization has been unsuccessful, even though such 
participation might lead to more choice, more efficiency, and 
more activation.  “Activation” is a term generally absent from 
social insurance discussions in the United States.  The term is 
used here to refer to activation strategies that seek to activate 
large groups of inactive persons in the labor market, such as 
recipients of unemployment or disability benefits.31  
Privatization, and the greater use of private actors in the social 
insurance context, tends to go hand-in-hand with redirecting 
resources toward activation strategies.32 
Part B. next explores the federal-state unemployment 
compensation program and highlights the few places where non-
public actors have played a role in this program, primarily in the 
job search context.  Additionally, this Part considers why it is 
unlikely that unions and employer organizations will play a 
greater role in the future development of this program, similar 
to the European Ghent System of unemployment insurance. 
Part C. discusses the largely inadequate American version 
of sickness benefits.  Unlike many other countries, the United 
States does not have a national social insurance scheme that 
provides for sickness benefits.  Instead, under the federal Family 
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), qualified employees are entitled 
to twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave for designated 
reasons.33  In addition to the federal FMLA, as discussed in more 
detail below, many states and municipalities have their own 
equivalent laws and various types of sickness benefits. 
Finally, Part D. is divided into two subparts.  The first 
subpart discusses the public health insurance programs, 
Medicare (for the elderly and disabled) and Medicaid (for the 
poor, needy or disabled).  The second subpart recognizes that 
without a true national healthcare system, those not covered by 
Medicare or Medicaid must find health insurance coverage 
either through their employer or on their own through the 
 
 31.  See Werner Eichhorst & Regina Konle-Seidl, The Interaction of Labor 
Market Regulation and Labor Market Policies in Welfare State Reform, 28 COMP. 
LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 27 (2006). 
 32.  See Robert H. Cox, From Safety Net to Trampoline: Labor Market Activation 
in the Netherlands and Denmark, 11 GOVERNANCE: INTL.J. POLICY & ADMIN. 397, 
397 (1998). 
 33.  29 U.S.C. § 2612. 
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private market.  Consequently, health insurance remains largely 
an employer-dominated area in the United States, and the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) plays a large role in the provisions of 
healthcare for an increasing number of Americans.  So, the 
second subpart discusses the provision of private health 
insurance through employer-sponsored plans under ACA and 
ERISA. 
A. OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS 
In the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance 
program (OASDI), the federal system organizes retirement 
security for elderly and disabled persons, as well as for survivors 
of elderly couples.34  The Social Security Act was signed into law 
by President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1935 as part of his 
New Deal Program.35  It now covers some 58 million Americans, 
with one out of every four American families receiving benefits, 
and for people aged sixty-five and older, it is the main source of 
income.36  In addition to the elderly, through the social 
supplemental insurance (SSI) program, more children receive 
benefits under Social Security than any other federal program.37  
It is also the most efficient social insurance program, costing less 
than one penny in administrative expenses for every dollar that 
it metes out.38  Because of its hallowed status after almost eighty 
 
 34.  See EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, Ch. 1: Employee Benefits in the 
United States: An Introduction, Employee Benefit Research Institute (March 2001). 
Additionally, a separate Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program provides 
monthly cash benefits to certain low-income elderly, disabled or blind Americans 
[hereinafter EBRI databook]. 
 35.  Eduard A. Lopez, Constitutional Background to the Social Security Act of 
1935, 50 SOC. SEC. BULLETIN 5, 6 (Jan. 1987), 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v50n1/v50n1p5.pdf. 
 36.  See Elisa A. Walker, Virginia P. Reno & Thomas N. Bethell, Social Security 
Finances: Findings of the 2014 Trustees Report, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. NO. 44, 2 
(July 2014), available at 
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_044.pdf. 
 37.  See EBRI Databook on Employee Benefits, supra note 34. “In the study, 84% 
of American’s agreed with the following statement: ‘I don’t mind paying for Social 
Security taxes because it provides security and stability to millions of retired 
Americans, disabled individuals, and the children and widowed spouses of deceased 
workers.’” Nat’s Acad. Of Soc. Ins., Video: Social Security: Americans Agree, NASI 
(http://www.nasi.org/learn/social-security/americansagree?) (last visited Apr. 21, 
2015). 
 38.  Id.  “Social Security is efficient.  Less than a penny of every one dollar is 
spent on administration, the rest is for the 55 million people who get benefits every 
month.” Social Security: Americans Agree, NASI (Aug. 10, 2012), 
http://www.nasi.org/learn/social-security/americansagree?; see also Social Security: 
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years in existence, it is considered to be politically untouchable 
and the “third rail” of politics in the United States.39 
Social Security provides an income base, in the form of a 
lifetime annuity, to nearly all retired and disabled workers and 
their surviving spouses.40  It was not until 1956, twenty years 
after the Social Security Act was initially enacted, that the 
Disability Insurance program was added to the Social Security 
program, providing income to disabled workers.41 
OASDI benefits are defined by federal statutory law.42  
Throughout its history, it has been consistently administered 
exclusively by public authorities, with a complete absence of any 
role for private actors.43  The program is a pay-as-you-go system 
(PAYG), meaning today’s workers pay (through payroll taxes 
matched in amount by their employers) for the benefits of 
today’s retirees.44  Social Security covers more than 95% of 
Americans, provides half of all retirement benefits, and 
currently, one in seven, or 58 million Americans, receive such 
benefits.45  Under the OASDI program, benefits are adjusted for 
 
Americans Agree, NASI (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.nasi.org/learn/social-
security/americansagree?. 
 39.  “It was former U.S. House Speaker Thomas ‘Tip’ O’Neill who first called 
Social Security the ‘third rail of American politics,’ and O’Neill did as much as 
anyone to make Social Security a deadly political issue.”  See Why Is Social Security 
Called the Third Rail of American Politics? SENIOR LIVING, 
http://seniorliving.about.com/od/socialsecurity101/a/socialsecurity.htm (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2015). 
 40.  Jonathan Barry Forman, Reforming Social Security to Encourage the 
Elderly to Work, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 289, 291–92 (1998). 
 41.  See John R. Kearney, Social Security and the “D” in OASDI: The History of a 
Federal Program Insuring Earners Against Disability, SOC. SEC. BULLETIN Vol. 66 
No. 3, 2, 9-11 (2005/2006), available at 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v66n3/v66n3p1.pdf (discussing the eventual 
addition of disability coverage along with operational considerations for its 
enactment and continued existence). 
 42.  The original Social Security Act was enacted 14 Aug. 1935.  The Social 
Security Act of 1935, Pub. L. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620.  Private occupational pension 
plans, a relatively new phenomenon in the United States, are generally governed by 
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-
1461 (2012). 
 43.  Kathryn L. Moore, Privatization of Social Security: Misguided Reform, 71 
TEMP. L. REV. 131, 136 (1998). 
 44.  See OASDI and SSI Programs Rates & Limits, 2014, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/quickfacts/prog_highlights/RatesLimits2014.html (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2015). Most people pay 6.2%, while self-employed persons pay 12.4%.  
Id. 
 45.  See DAVID A. PRATT & SHARON REECE, ERISA AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW: 
THE ESSENTIALS 5, 7 (American Bar Association Publishing 2010); see Elisa A. 
Walker, Virginia P. Reno & Thomas N. Bethell, Social Security Finances: Findings of 
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inflation and support the beneficiary’s spouse during the 
beneficiary’s life, as well as after the beneficiary’s death.46 
There is some debate about whether Social Security is in 
financial trouble and in need of reform.47  On the one hand, the 
financial distress of the system stems, in part, from a smaller 
generation of workers seeking to support a larger generation of 
workers (i.e., the baby boomers).48  Indeed, as a result of 
increased life expectancies, there has been “a decrease in the 
ratio of [old age and survivor insurance] OASI-covered workers 
to OASI beneficiaries from 16.5 in 1950 to 3.7 in 1970 to 3.2 in 
2008.”49  At some point, there will be more beneficiaries than 
workers, and the PAYG system will falter.  In the meantime, in 
attempt to keep this scenario from coming to fruition, the 
retirement age for full social security benefits has been raised to 
sixty-seven for those born after 1960,50  and payroll taxes have 
been raised to help keep the system solvent.51  Although not 
exactly optimistic about the future of the Social Security System, 
the 2014 report by the Trustees of the Social Security System 
does point out that the system is not in short-term danger of 
failing, but some immediate legislative action could forestall 
further difficulties.52  The Disability Trust fund faces the largest 
 
the 2014 Trustees Report, NAT’L ACAD. OF SOC. INS. NO. 44, 2 (July 2014), available at 
http://www.nasi.org/sites/default/files/research/SS_Brief_044.pdf. 
 46.  Forman, supra note 40, at 291. 
 47.  See Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, a Summary of the 
2012 Annual Reports, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TRSUM/index.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (“[T]he 
long-run actuarial deficits of the Social Security and Medicare programs worsened in 
2012. The actuarial deficit in Social Security increased largely because of the 
incorporation of updated economic data and assumptions.”). 
 48.  See Amanda Alix, Are Baby Boomers Going to Drain Social Security Dry? 
THE MOTLEY FOOL (May 11, 2014), 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/05/11/are-baby-boomers-going-to-drain-
social-security-dr.aspx.  The article states that the Social Security system depends on 
the "old-age dependency ratio”—the ratio of people sixty-five and older to those ages 
twenty to sixty-four.  Id.  In 2012, that ratio was 22.8%, but by 2050 that number is 
expected to rise to 38.4%. Id.  
 49.  EBRI Databook, supra note 34. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  See Moore, supra note 43, at 136, 145 (describing how the Social Security 
system is funded by payroll taxes that are imposed on both employees and 
employers, and how benefits cannot increase unless payroll taxes are increased, 
which may be unacceptable to many Americans). 
 52.  Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees, The Status of Social 
Security and Medicare Programs: A Summary of the 2014 Annual Reports 5, SOC. 
SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/oact/tr/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (“While the 
theoretical combined OASDI Trust Fund fails the long range test of close actuarial 
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challenges, with its beneficiaries facing benefit cuts starting in 
2016 if Congress does not take immediate action.53 
Social security alone does not provide adequate retirement 
income, evidenced by the fact that a large majority of U.S. 
workers will see about a 40%–50% income replacement ratio 
from Social Security.54  Most experts believe that at least a 70% 
income replacement ratio is required to have adequate 
retirement income.55  As discussed below employer-provided 
pension and retirement plans have become so important in the 
United States as a result of the current state of Social Security 
benefits and the lack of personal savings. 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is one system through 
which eligible people receive retirement income, but it is strictly 
based on need.56  In general, a person can qualify for SSI 
benefits if he or she meets the following requirements: (1) is at 
least sixty-five years old, (2) is blind or disabled, (3) has limited 
income and resources, and (4) is either a U.S. Citizen or national 
or eligible alien.57  For 2014, those eligible individuals who fit 
the criteria can receive $721 per month ($1,082 for an eligible 
person with an eligible spouse).58  The purpose of SSI payments 
 
balance, it does satisfy the test for short-range (10-year) financial adequacy. The 
Trustees project that the combined trust fund asset reserves at the beginning of each 
year will exceed that year’s projected cost through 2027.”). 
 53.  Id. at 3-4 (“Social Security’s Disability Insurance (DI) program satisfies 
neither the Trustees’ long-range test of close actuarial balance nor their short-range 
test of financial adequacy and faces the most immediate financing shortfall of any of 
the separate trust funds.”). 
 54.  See Aon Consulting, Replacement Ratio Summary: A Measurement Tool for 
Retirement Planning 2, AON.COM (2008), http://www.aon.com/about-aon/intellectual-
capital/attachments/human-capital-consulting/RRStudy070308.pdf (chart 
illustrating that a person retiring with income of $60,000 can expect a replacement 
ratio of 46%). An income replacement ration “is a person’s gross income after 
retirement, divided by his or her gross income before retirement.”  Id. 
 55.  See Jack VanDerhei, Can Social Security and 401(k) Savings Be “Enough”?, 
EMP. BENEFIT RES. INST. (Jan. 22, 2014), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/PR1058.RetAdqcy.22Jan14.pdf (reiterating that 70% of 
replacement income is the typical standard for what is believed to be a financially 
successful retirement). 
 56.  See Beth Laurence, What Is The Difference Between Social Security 
Disability (SSDI) and SSI?, DISABILITYSECRETS.COM, 
http://www.disabilitysecrets.com/page5-13.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (funding 
for SSI is through a "means-tested program," which has nothing to do with work 
history, it is all based on financial need). 
 57.  See Understanding Supplemental Security Income SSI Eligibility 
Requirements – 2014 Edition, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/ssi/text-
eligibility-ussi.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 58.  See SSI Federal Payment Amounts for 2014, Annual Report of the 
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are to help people pay for necessities—food, clothes and housing.  
Many disabled individuals who get SSI will also be eligible to get 
Medicaid from the state in which they live.59  But because SSI is 
a federal benefit with specific requirements, the government can 
be as stringent as it would like in enforcing who receives it.  This 
has even led some to question its effectiveness and whether it 
actually helps to perpetuate people living near the poverty line.60 
In addition to the federal SSI payments, forty-six  states 
offer supplementary state SSI payments.61  As the supplemental 
programs are state-run, each state can decide on its own how 
much of a benefit to offer.  As of 2013, Wisconsin, for example, 
would pay up to $83.78 per month to an eligible individual 
($132.05 per eligible couple).62  Critics attack state SSI claiming 
states have an incentive to get a “welfare-receiving family [i.e. 
receiving public assistance] with a disabled child, onto the SSI 
rolls.”63 
 
Supplemental Security Income Program, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSI.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 59.  See Laurence, supra note 56 (saying many of those on SSI also likely be 
qualified to receive food stamps). 
 60.  See Julie Turkewitz & Juliet Linderman, The Disability Trap, N.Y. TIMES, 
SR5 (Oct. 20, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/21/sunday-review/the-trap-of-
supplemental-security-income.html (recounting the story of Brad Crelia, and how 
SSI is supposed to be his “safety net,” but “is actually the source of the problem, 
experts say. S.S.I. traps many disabled people by limiting their income to levels just 
above the poverty line, and taking away their cash benefits if they achieve any level 
of security.”).  Crelia commented, “I’ve been kept financially sort of in this cage. Just 
basic things that people rely upon, having a normal life, aren’t things that are really 
accessible. And won’t be.”  Id.  
 61.  See Laurence, supra note 56 (listing Arizona, North Dakota, West Virginia, 
and Mississippi as the four states who do not offer supplemental SSI); SSI State 
Supplementary Payments/Optional State Supplements and Eldercare, PAYING FOR 
SENIOR CARE, 
http://www.payingforseniorcare.com/longtermcare/resources/ssi_state_ssp_oss.html, 
(last updated Jan. 2014). 
 62.  See Benefits of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), WIS. DEP’T OF HEALTH 
SERVS, http://www.dhs.wisconsin.gov/ssi/benefits.htm (last revised Mar. 27, 2014) 
(qualifying the specifics for Wisconsin SSI eligibility, including how it operates, who 
qualifies and payment levels). 
 63.  See Patricia Wen, Aid to disabled children now outstrips welfare, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/08/27/cash-
distributed-under-ssi-for-children-now-
exceedswelfare/ek0peSWTLJ00YId0CONFYI/story.html (talking about the massive 
growth in SSI payments, especially for qualified children and how much strain it is 
putting on the system). 
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B. STATE AND EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DISABILITY 
PROGRAMS (SSDI) 
In addition to being eligible for disability benefits under 
SSDI, many states have different forms of short-term and long-
term disability programs, which provide income replacement for 
qualified disabilities.64  Additionally, many employers provide 
short-term and long-term disability plans as one of the welfare 
benefits they provide to their employees.65 
SSDI can best be described as a related but separate 
component of SSI, with a couple of important distinctions.  First, 
SSDI is an earned benefit provided to people with physical and 
mental impairments that are severe enough to keep them from 
carrying on in their regular jobs or from partaking in any other 
type of work.66  For an impairment to be deemed severe enough, 
it must be believed that it will last for one year at minimum, or 
that it will inhibit a person throughout his or her life.67  Second, 
there is a distinction in how the two programs receive funds: 
SSDI is fuelled by Social Security taxes that workers, employers, 
and the self-employed pay, whereas SSI gets paid out of the 
Treasury Department’s general revenue.68  So even though SSI 
and SSDI use the same definition to classify disabled adults, 
SSDI focuses on impairment-based need, while SSI is for people 
with very low income.69 
Only five states provide short-term disability benefits 
(sometimes called temporary disability insurance (TDI)): 
California, Hawaii, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island.70  
 
 64.  See 2014 CDA Long Term Disability Claims Review, COUNCIL FOR 
DISABILITY AWARENESS, 8 (2014), available at 
http://www.disabilitycanhappen.org/research/CDA_LTD_Claims_Survey_2014.pdf 
(151 million workers had disability insurance coverage via SSDI at the end of 2013, 
which represented a 0.2 percent increase from 2012). 
 65.  2013 Employee Benefits: An Overview of Employee Benefits Offerings in the 
U.S., SOC. FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT 12 (Feb. 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Employee 
Benefits]. Id.  
 66.  See Stan Hinden, What’s the Difference Between SSDI and SSI?, AARP 
BULLETIN (June 13, 2012), http://www.aarp.org/work/social-security/info-06-
2012/social-security-disability-insurance-supplemental-securityincome.html 
(comparing the key components of both SSDI and SSI). 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  See State Short-Term Disability Benefits, NOLO.COM, 
http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/state-short-term-disability-benefits (last 
visited Apr. 22, 2015) (providing links to further reading about each state’s short-
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The purpose of such programs is to give people partial pay 
replacement if they cannot work for more than three days due to 
conditions such as injury, illness, or pregnancy.71  While it is just 
one example, California administers its program through its 
Employment Development Department, which requires all 
employees to contribute to short-term disability via payroll 
deductions.72  Through this structure, if someone cannot work 
due to disability, that person can then get weekly payments 
until she or he goes back to work or his or her benefits run out.73 
More commonly, however, disability programs (outside of 
SSDI) are provided by employers.  In its 2013 review of claims 
data, the Council for Disability Awareness, which is comprised of 
nineteen insurance providers, found that more than 213,000 
employers make long-term disability insurance available to their 
employees.74  This is a marginal increase in terms of number of 
providers, but the number of people who opt-in for coverage 
declined by about 1.5%.75  Despite the decrease in coverage, 
payment claims increased once again, up to $9.8 billion in 
2013.76 
The way that long-term disability typically works in the 
employment context is that it is a voluntary benefit, meaning 
that the employee pays the full cost of coverage.77  In the past, 
however, many employers took it upon themselves to pay the full 
cost, or at least pay for coverage up to a certain level.78  
According to Barry Lundquist, president of the Council for 
Disability Awareness, there are a few good reasons for the 
change in how companies approach disability insurance, such as 
“employers are focused on compliance with the new Affordable 
 
term disability specifics). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  See Ashlea Ebeling, Disability Insurance: The Overlooked Employee Benefit, 
FORBES (June 19, 2014, 8:51 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ashleaebeling/2014/06/19/disability-insurance-the-
overlooked-employee-benefit/ (discussing recent shifts in long-term disability 
coverage and offerings, including the impact of voluntary versus involuntary 
enrollment plans). 
 75.  See id. (Only 32.1 million people had long-term disability coverage in 2013 
compared to 34 million in 2009).  32 million is 22% of the current employed persons 
of 146 million.  So a little less than one in four working Americans have disability 
coverage from their employer.  Id. 
 76.  Id.  
 77.  Id.  
 78.  Id. 
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Care Act’s health insurance provisions—so employers and 
agents/brokers are saying they’ll deal with other benefits like 
disability insurance later.”79  Another factor is tied back to 
whether disability is a voluntary versus employer-driven benefit.  
For voluntary (employee choice) plans, enrollment is about 
40%.80  Of course for an employer-paid plan, employees are 
automatically enrolled, but they are sometimes given the choice 
if they want to increase coverage by making pay check 
deferrals.81 
C. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
The current United States unemployment insurance (UI) 
system82  was enacted in 1935 as part of the New Deal program 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.83  The UI system provides 
temporary, partial wage replacement for workers who are 
unemployed through no fault of their own.84  The unemployment 
compensation system is based on a joint federal-state scheme 
that effectively encourages states to form their own UI 
programs.85  Under this scheme, the federal government does 
not directly provide UI benefits, but states receive federal 
subsidies for their own UI programs.86  The source of federal 
funding is a tax, currently set at 6.2% of the first $7,00087 in 
wages, on every covered employee in the United States.88  Under 
the Federal Unemployment Tax Act,89 an employer may offset 
this federal tax with any state UI taxes it pays, up to 5.4% of the 
 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. (quoting Lundquist about enrollment statistics). 
 81.  Id. (mentioning various scenarios for people to think about when deciding 
how much coverage is truly enough to cover expenses, etc.). 
 82.  42 U.S.C. §§ 501 504, 1101 1108 (2012). 
 83.  The New Deal, HISTORY CHANNEL (March 28, 2015), 
http://www.history.com/topics/new-deal. 
 84.  Lisa Lawler Graditor, Back to Basics: A Call to Re-Evaluate the 
Unemployment Insurance Disqualification for Misconduct, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 
27, 30–31 (2003) (describing the standard qualifications for receiving unemployment 
insurance). 
 85.  Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 335, 340 (2001). 
 86.  See id. at 344 (describing how states receive federal administrative funds 
and tax rebates for establishing UI programs). 
 87.  For the purposes of this article all currency is noted in terms of the US 
dollar.  
 88.  26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012); see also 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b)(1) (2012). 
 89.  26 U.S.C. § 3301 (2012); see Walker supra note 45, at 2. 
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$7,000 base wage.90 Not surprisingly, this incentive has proven 
very effective, as every state currently has its own UI program.91  
Yet, states have substantial flexibility in setting eligibility 
criteria once minimum federal requirements have been met.92 
The State of Wisconsin, which had the first unemployment 
compensation system in the country,93 provides a good example 
of how a “traditional” unemployment compensation system 
works in the United States.94  Generally, Wisconsin bases UI 
eligibility on a worker’s length of time in the workforce, how the 
end of the employment relationship occurred, and the extent to 
which the worker is looking for a new job.95  Workers who are 
eligible for UI benefits frequently must wait a week before 
receiving their benefit, and the maximum duration of benefit 
receipt is usually twenty-six weeks.96  Benefits consist of 
payments of up to 50% of the worker’s previous weekly wage, 
capped by a statutory maximum.97 
 
 90.  See FUTA Credit Reduction, IRS (last updated Oct. 24, 2014), 
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Small-Businesses-&- Self-Employed/FUTA-Credit-
Reduction (explaining the FUTA tax credit for employers). 
 91.  Lester, supra note 85, at 340. 
 92.  See Amy B. Chasanov, Clarifying Conditions for Nonmonetary Eligibility in 
the Unemployment Insurance System, 29 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 89, 89 (1996) 
(describing the American unemployment insurance program as “a federal-state 
program, where each state determines its own eligibility requirements with only 
minimal requirements imposed by the federal government”). 
 93.  Graditor, supra note 84, at 34 (describing how the Wisconsin legislature 
rejected unemployment legislation ten times “before becoming the first state to enact 
such legislation in 1932”). 
 94.  See History of Unemployment Insurance in the United States, U.S. DEP’T OF 
LABOR (2010), http://www.dol.gov/ocia/pdf/75th-Anniversary-Summary-FINAL.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 95.  See generally ST. OF WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV.: UNEMPLOYMENT INS., 
https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/before_menu.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 96.  Monetary Entitlement, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING 
ADMIN., CH. 3 (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) 
http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/pdf/uilawcompar/2010/monetary.pdf. As a result 
of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, P.L. 111-5, passed by the US 
Congress in February 2009, many unemployed people can receive up to 99 weeks of 
unemployment insurance benefits. Still, there are those who run out of eligibility 
before being able to find a new job. These individuals refer to themselves as “99ers.” 
See 99ers, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/99ers (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 97.  A typical maximum cap is one-half to one-third of the state’s average weekly 
wage. Because of the maximum benefit caps, the effective rate of wage replacement 
for employees receiving unemployment compensation benefits is about one-third of 
their former salary. See Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and the 
Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. REV. 319, 365 (2012) (“In the United States, the average 
replacement rate is 36%.”); The Best States for Unemployment Benefits: Would You 
Work If You Could Make $1,800 A Month Doing Nothing?, FINANCIAL SAMURAI (last 
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The most significant disqualification factors for receiving 
unemployment compensation are (1) whether the employee 
voluntarily quit his or her employment,98 (2) whether he or she 
was fired for “wilful misconduct,” (changed as of January 2014 to 
“substantial misconduct,” a lower standard, at least in 
Wisconsin),99 and (3) whether he or she did not continue to 
search for work under the job search requirement.100  If any of 
the three factors are applicable to the employee, the right to 
benefits could be partially or completely terminated. As for the 
job search requirement, a worker must be not only willing and 
able to work, but must also actively seek a new job in order to 
continue to receive unemployment compensation.101  Workers 
must also accept suitable employment when found to be entitled 
to unemployment compensation.102 
Established during the New Deal, state job centers, 
sometimes referred to as “labor exchanges,” help workers meet 
the job search requirement.103  They function through “One-Stop 
 
accessed Apr. 22, 2015) http://www.financialsamurai.com/best-states-for-
unemployment-benefits/. 
 98.  Deborah Maranville, Changing Economy, Changing Lives: Unemployment 
Insurance and the Contingent Workforce, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 291, 304 (1995). 
 99.  Daniel R. Schuckers & James K. Bradley, Trends in Unemployment 
Compensation Law, 78 PA. B.A. Q. 40, 42 (2007); Unemployment Law Changes for 
Workers, WIS. DEP’T OF WORKFORCE DEV., 
http://dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/lawchanges.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
 100.  See id. (describing the job search requirements for unemployment insurance 
eligibility in Wisconsin). 
 101.  EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING ADMINISTRATION ADVISORY SYSTEM, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAM LETTER NO. 26-13, 
REQUEST FOR CURRENT LAW ON STATE WORK SEARCH REQUIREMENTS (Apr. 10, 2014), 
available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/dmstree/uipl/uipl2k13/uipl_2813.pdf; 
26 U.S.C. § 3304 (2012).  As far as the work search requirement in Wisconsin, there 
is a basic requirement that benefit a claimant personally and diligently make a 
reasonable search for suitable work.  In some other instances, claimants are directed 
to participate in reemployment programs.  See WIS. STAT. § 108.04(2)(a).  To meet 
this requirement, claimants must file an online work search log, which may be 
completed online at http://unemployment.wisconsin.gov. See State of Wisconsin 
Department of Workforce Development, Unemployment Insurance: Part 4: Work 
Search, WIS. DEP.T OF WORKFORCE DEV., 
http://www.dwd.wisconsin.gov/uiben/handbook/english/contentspart4.htm (updated 
Mar. 9, 2015). 
 102.  See Knox v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 315 A. 2d 915, 
916 (Pa. Cmwlth Ct. 1974) (denying unemployment compensation where employee 
lost new job when he told prospective employer that he would go back to old job if 
recalled from layoff). 
 103.  See Thomas Janoski, Review of Three Cheers for the Unemployed: 
Government and Unemployment before the New Deal, CONT. SOC., Vol. 22 No. 3 392-
93 (May 1993) http://www.jstor.org/stable/2074520. 
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Career Centers,” which match unemployed workers with 
suitable job positions, and also ensure that workers continue to 
search for work while on unemployment.104 
It is unlikely that participation by unions, such as in the 
Ghent System where funding for unemployment benefits is 
handled by trade unions and not governmental actors,105 will 
ever happen.106  The reasons are at least two-fold.  First, unions 
are generally weak in the United States, where they make up 
less than 7% of the private, non-agricultural workforce.107  Their 
ability to push a union-based, Ghent-style system, even in states 
with higher union density rates, is therefore questionable.  
Second, and perhaps even more significantly, it is not clear at all 
whether the federal Social Security Act in the United States 
would permit a Ghent-style unemployment system in the United 
States.  Sections 303(a)(1) and (2) of the SSA establish that the 
Secretary of Labor will not certify payments of federal funds to 
states unless states provide such methods of administration as 
are “‘found by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably calculated 
to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when 
due’ and ‘[p]ayment of unemployment compensation solely 
through public employment offices or such other agencies as the 
Secretary of Labor may approve.’”108  Thus, to involve unions in 
 
 104.  Louis S. Jacobson, Strengthening One-Stop Career Centers: Helping More 
Unemployed Workers Find Jobs and Build Skills, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 5, (April, 
2009); Cox, supra note 32 at 397. 
 105.  See generally Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law is Dead–
Long Live Labour Law!, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. 545, 577-578 (2012-2013). Under the Ghent 
System, “unions administer government-subsidized unemployment insurance funds,” 
and the only way to get access to those funds is for a worker to join a union. Id. 
Union density in countries that have this system is unsurprisingly high. Id. 
 106.  But see Matthew Dimick, Paths to Power: Labor Law, Union Density, and 
the Ghent System, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 41-49 (2012).  Under the federal Social Security 
Act, by contrast, the federal government leaves states with some discretion to 
determine conditions for eligibility and the amount and duration of benefits for 
public unemployment insurance programs. In states where labor unions hold more 
favor and influence, state-level Ghent systems could be adopted and serve as 
examples and catalysts for change elsewhere.  Id.   
 107.  United States Department of Labor, Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS 2010 (Jan. 21, 2009), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm (finding that the union membership 
rate for private sector workers was 6.9% in 2010); United States Department of 
Labor, Union Members Summary, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 2014 (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/union2_01212011.pdf (finding that the 
union membership rate for private sector workers was 6.6% in 2014). 
 108.  Dimick, supra note 97, at 368 69 (quoting Social Security Act § 303(a)(2), 
42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(2) (2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 303(a)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 503(a)(2) 
(2006)). 
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unemployment compensation, the SSA would have to be 
amended to certify payments to unions and to permit unions to 
make payments when due.  Such a scenario is highly unlikely in 
the anti-union environment of the United States.109 
D. SICKNESS AND FAMILY BENEFITS: THE FAMILY AND 
MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA) 
As noted above, the United States does not have a true 
sickness social insurance benefit.  Instead, the federal 
government mandated, via the FMLA enacted in 1993, that all 
covered employers (with fifty or more employees in a seventy-
five-mile radius) provide covered employees (who have worked 
for the employer for at least one year, and more than 1250 hours 
in the previous year) twelve weeks of unpaid, job-protected leave 
for one of four covered situations.110  These situations include (1) 
one’s own “serious health condition,” (2) the “serious health 
condition” of a close family member (child, spouse—including 
same-sex spouse—or parent), (3) the birth of a child, or (4) the 
adoption or foster care of a child.111  A serious health condition is 
defined as in-hospital treatment, treatment for chronic 
conditions, conditions related to pregnancy, or continuing 
treatment by a doctor for more than a three-day period (which 
requires one doctor visit with a medical prescription or more 
than one doctor visit).112 
Although such Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) 
provides sick leave, that leave is presumptively unpaid.113  
Employers can force employees to use other sources of paid time 
off (e.g., vacation and sick pay) to provide payment during this 
leave time.114  Employers can also (1) define the twelve-month 
period in which the worker receives the twelve weeks of leave 
 
 109.  See Scott Martelle, Why Americans Support Both Unions and Right-to-Work 
Laws, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014, 12:50 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-labor-organizing-gallup-wages-
benefits-20140829-story.html (relaying Gallup poll information showing Americans 
varied feelings about unions – with 53% saying they support them, but 71% saying 
they support right-to-work laws). 
 110.  See generally The Family Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (last 
visited Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/1421.htm.   
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. 
 113.  29 U.S.C. § 2612(c) (2012). 
 114.  The Family Medical Leave Act, supra note 110. 
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(usually starting the first day of FMLA leave);115 (2) require 
notification of the need for leave (though magic words invoking 
FMLA are not required);116 (3) require medical certification of 
the need for leave, and in the case of an employee’s own serious 
health condition, require a fitness for duty certification to come 
back to work;117 and (4) if the FMLA leave is for intermittent or 
reduced leave, the employer may place the employee in a more 
appropriate job during that time period.118  Employers are 
supposed to keep employees on their current health insurance 
plan during FMLA leave, but if the worker does not return from 
leave, employers can ask for reimbursement of their insurance 
contributions119  Finally, an employee cannot be terminated or 
face adverse employment consequences for exercising his or her 
rights under the FMLA, but the employer is free to eliminate his 
or her position for non-FMLA related reasons.120 
This is the extent of sickness benefits at the federal level in 
the United States.  There is no federally required sick pay or 
maternity leave.121  As a result, a number of states and 
municipalities have enacted their own laws to fill in the gap.122  
For example, the city of San Francisco has a Paid Sick Leave 
Ordinance that requires employees to earn one hour of sick leave 
for every thirty hours worked, generally up to seventy-two hours 
of accrued paid sick leave saved up at any time.123  Only three 
states provide for paid maternity/family leave (California, New 
Jersey, and Rhode Island).124  “All three states fund their 
programs through employee-paid payroll taxes and are 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Carol Evans, Mandated Paid Maternity Leave: It’s Time to End the 
Divide Between the ‘Haves’ and the ‘Have-Nots,’ HUFF. POST (June 24, 2014, 6:42 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/carol-evans/mandated-paid-maternity-
leave_b_5525605.html (showing that only 16% of all U.S. companies offer paid 
maternity leave). 
 122.  Id. Only a few states, most notably California and New Jersey, have 
mandated maternity leave for moms. 
 123.  S.F., CAL., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 12W.2(B)(C) (2014), available at 
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=419; see Paid Sick Leave Ordinance- Fact Sheet, 
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, 
http://sfgsa.org/index.aspx?page=419 (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).  
 124.  State Family Medical Leave Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Dec. 31, 
2013), http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/state-family-and-medical-
leave-laws.aspx.   
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administered through their respective disability programs.”125  
More specifically, California provides: 
Up to [twelve] weeks of unpaid family leave plus 4 
months of maternity disability may be combined for a 
total of [twenty-eight] weeks per year.  The California 
Paid Family Leave insurance program provides up to 
[six] weeks of paid leave to care for a seriously ill child, 
spouse, parent, or registered domestic partner, or to 
bond with a new child.  The benefit amount is 
approximately 55% of an employee’s weekly wage, from 
a minimum of $50 to a maximum of $1067.  The 
program is funded through employee-paid payroll taxes 
and is administered through the state’s disability 
program.126 
Connecticut is the only state that provides for paid sick 
leave for private sector employers that have fifty or more 
employees and requires up to forty hours of paid sick leave 
annually, depending on the number of hours employees work.127  
Other states have their own family and medical leave acts that 
may apply to smaller employers and to more employees, but 
generally, these acts only provide unpaid leave.128 
E. PUBLIC AND PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
1. Public Health Social Insurance Programs 
The two public health insurance programs in the United 
 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id.  
 127.  Id. 
 128.  See, e.g., Wisconsin Family and Medical Leave Act, ST. OF WIS. DEP’T OF 
WORKFORCE DEV., https://dwd.wisconsin.gov/er/family_and_medical_leave/ (last 
visited Apr. 29, 2015) (providing that “employers with 50 or more permanent 
employees must allow employees of either sex up to six (6) weeks of leave in a 
calendar year for the birth or adoption of a child, up to two (2) weeks of leave in a 
calendar year for the care of a child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, as defined in 
§§ 40.02(1) or 770.01(1), parent of a domestic partner with a serious health condition 
and up to two (2) weeks of leave in a calendar year for the employee’s own serious 
health condition.”); see also Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), TEXAS 
WORKFORCE COMMISSION 
http://www.twc.state.tx.us/news/efte/family_and_medical_leave_act_fmla.html (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2014) (operating in a very similar fashion to both the federal 
standards, as well as other states).   
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States are Medicare and Medicaid.129  Medicare provides 
approximately 50 million sixty-five-and-older and disabled130  
Americans with hospital,131 medical,132 and prescription drug133 
coverage.134  Currently, non-public actors play no role in the 
administration of the Medicare scheme, but private healthcare 
providers of all types receive payment for their medical services 
through this program.135  Medicaid, on the other hand, is not 
 
 129.  Medicare and Medicaid were formally enacted amendments (Titles XVIII 
and XIX, respectively) to the Social Security Act (1935) and went into effect in 1966. 
Medicare falls under Title 42   The Public Health and Welfare Chapter 7   Social 
Security Subchapter Xviii   Health Insurance For Aged and Disabled. See also The 
Basics of Social Security, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE (July 2013), 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/0713fact.pdf.  There really is not a 
separate sickness benefit program in the United States. Although employees may 
receive sick leave as part of their employment, they are generally not entitled to sick 
leave as a matter of federal or most state laws.  Instead, they have a right to 
protected, unpaid job leave for: (1) their own serious health conditions, (2) the serious 
health condition of an immediate family member, or (3) for the birth or adoption of a 
child, under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA); 29 U.S.C. §§ 
2601, 2611-2619, 2651- 2653. 
 130.  See Sean M. Novak, How to Create and Maintain a Medicare Set-Aside 
Trust, LOS ANGELES LAWYER, March 2012, at 15 (citing Medicare Eligibility 
Guidelines, SSA Pub. No. 05-1004) (June 2011), 
http://www.ssa.gov/pubs/10043.html). To qualify for Medicare under the disability 
category, “an individual must submit an application showing that he or she is 
[eighteen] years old or older, has worked in jobs covered by Social Security, and has a 
medical condition that has prevented the applicant from working (or is expected to 
prevent the applicant from working) for at least [twelve] months or end in death.” Id. 
 131.  Sandra J. Carnahan, Medicare’s Coverage with Study Participation Policy: 
Clinical Trials or Tribulations?, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 229, 224 
(2007); see also Novak, supra note 130. 
 132.  Id. “Part A, or Hospital Insurance (HI), includes hospital, skilled nursing, 
home health, and hospice care. Medicare Part B, or the Supplementary Medical 
Insurance Program (MI), includes physician and other out-patient services. Part C, 
or Medicare Advantage, is a managed care option added by the Balanced Budget Act 
of 1997 . . . .” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (2003) (Part A); 42 U.S.C. § 1395j (2012) 
(Part B); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21-28 (2003) (Part C or Medicare Advantage Plans)). 
 133.  In 2003, the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization 
Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 111 Stat. 2066 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-101), 
expanded the Medicare program by creating Medicare Part D, a prescription drug 
benefit that came into full effect in 2006. 
 134.  See Carnahan, supra note 131, at 234. “[T]here are currently over 47.5 
million Americans covered by Medicare, of whom 39.6 million are aged 65 and older, 
and 7.9 million are disabled. Total benefits paid in 2010 were $516 billion.” Novak, 
supra note 130. Such coverage is financed through an employer/employee Medicare 
Tax. This tax has “increased from 0.6 [%] in 1970 on a maximum taxable amount of 
$7,800 of annual earnings to 1.45 [%] in 2011 with no cap on the maximum amount 
of annual earnings subject to the tax.”  See EBRI Databook, supra note 34, at 5.   
 135.  Eleanor D. Kinney, The Medicare Appeals System for Coverage and Payment 
Disputes: Achieving Fairness in a Time of Constraint, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1987). 
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strictly a social insurance program.  It is a federal-state, joint-
financed program for low-income, seriously ill and disabled 
individuals.136  At its heart, Medicaid requires states to receive 
and process all Medicaid applications and to provide medical 
services to eligible individuals.137 
Medicaid is not a subsidy scheme for clinics and hospitals, 
but instead a third-party payment system structured to operate 
like insurance, paying participating healthcare professionals and 
institutions for covered services furnished to enrolled persons.138  
Recently, the federal government began to play a less significant 
role in its administration, and states are gaining more discretion 
to keep poor Americans off their Medicaid rolls in order to reign 
in the spiralling cost of Medicaid coverage.139 
Private actors, such as employers and unions, play a large 
role in the private employer-based health insurance system.  
There historically has been little regulation of employer-based 
health plans and employers have “great discretion in 
determining eligibility criteria and what benefits to offer under 
such plans”, although this is beginning to change with the 
passage of the Affordable Care Act in 2010.140  Unions, for their 
 
 136.  See Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning 
in a Post-Deficit Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 6, 9 (2006) 
(“Medicaid rest[s] on a financial base consisting of a shared federal/state contribution 
arrangement, with the federal government as the senior partner.”); See also id. at 10 
(“Medicaid follow[s] the tradition of federal grant-in-aid programs, enacted pursuant 
to Congress’s spending clause powers, which condition the receipt of federal funds by 
states that elect to participate on compliance with a series of structural and 
operation conditions of participation.”). 
 137.  Id. at 12. 
 138.  Cf. Peter Ubel, Why Many Physicians Are Reluctant To See Medicaid 
Patients, FORBES (Nov. 7, 2013, 11:02 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterubel/2013/11/07/why-many-physicians-are-
reluctant-to-see-medicaid-patients/.  Some physicians admit their reluctance in 
seeing Medicaid patients due to reimbursement payments. On average, Medicaid 
pays roughly 61% of what Medicare pays for outpatient services. Id. “Physicians 
interviewed in the study explained that they felt it was their duty to see some 
amount of Medicaid patients in their practice. They recognized the moral need to 
provide care for this population. But they did not want to commit career suicide– 
they did not want good deeds to bankrupt their clinical practices.” Id.  
 139.  See The Coverage Gap: Uninsured Poor Adults in States that Do Not Expand 
Medicaid, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. (Apr. 2, 2014), http://kff.org/health-
reform/issue-brief/the-coverage-gap-uninsured-poor-adults-in-states-that-do-not-
expand-medicaid/ (detailing statistics about which states expanded Medicaid 
coverage, along with coverage and economic consequences from those decision). 
 140.  See RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 209 
(LEXISNEXIS 2007); See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education 
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part, play a significant role with multi-employer health plans, 
where health insurance is provided as part of a collective 
bargaining agreement.141  There is no close linkage between 
union and employer-provided health insurance and Medicare 
and Medicaid in the United States, as is sometimes seen in other 
countries’ social insurance programs.142 
If Americans are not covered by Medicare or Medicaid, there 
is no national health insurance system to rely on.143  Instead, 
individuals not covered by either Medicare or Medicaid must 
receive health insurance through their employer or purchase it 
on the open market, which historically has been prohibitively 
expensive.144  Otherwise, the person will be uninsured.  
Approximately 42 million Americans, or about 13% of the 
population, currently have no health insurance.145 
Medicare, like Social Security, is facing significant financial 
troubles. According to the most recent Trustees’ Report: 
The Trustees project that the Medicare Hospital 
Insurance (HI) Trust Fund will be the next to face 
depletion after the DI Trust Fund. The projected date of 
HI Trust Fund depletion is 2030, four years later than 
projected in last year’s report. At that time dedicated 
revenues will be sufficient to pay 85 [%] of HI costs.146 
 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029; See also infra notes 
135 141 and accompanying text.   
 141.  A multiemployer health plan is sponsored by more than one employer under 
provisions of a collective bargaining agreement for the benefit of union members. See 
29 U.S.C. § 1002(37) (2012). Under section 302(c)(5) of the Taft Hartley Amendments 
of 1947, multiemployer benefits plans must be established in trust to provide 
employee benefits to union employees. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 
U.S.C. section 186(c)(5) (2010). No such multiemployer health plan arrangements 
currently exist in the Medicare or Medicaid program.   
 142.  See generally infra Part III on the social protections benefit system in the 
Netherlands. 
 143.  See Rosenbaum, supra note 136, at 7 (“Among industrial democracies, the 
United States Stands alone in relying on voluntary markets to insure most of the 
population.”). 
 144.  Id. (“With the cost of employer-sponsored family coverage hovering at 
$10,000 in 2004   among employers that elect to offer any coverage   private 
insurance is unaffordable to millions of people.”). 
 145.  See Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act—CBO’s April 
2014 Baseline, Cong. Budget Office (Apr. 14, 2014), 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2014-04-
ACAtables2.pdf (pulling data from Table 2, “Effects of the Affordable Care Act on 
Health Insurance Coverage”). 
 146.  Social Security and Medicare Board of Trustees, A Summary of the 2014 
Annual Reports; Status of the Social Security and Medicare Programs, SOC. SEC. 
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On the other hand, other Parts of Medicare appear to be in 
better shape (though the cost of healthcare in the United States 
continues to grow at a startling pace): 
The Trustees project that Part B of Supplementary 
Medical Insurance (SMI), which pays doctors’ bills and 
other outpatient expenses, and Part D of SMI, which 
provides access to prescription drug coverage, will 
remain adequately financed into the indefinite future 
because current law automatically provides financing 
each year to meet the next year’s expected costs. 
However, the aging population and rising health care 
costs cause SMI projected costs to grow steadily from 
1.9 [%] of GDP in 2013 to approximately 3.3 [%] of GDP 
in 2035, and then more slowly to 4.5 [%] of GDP by 
2088.147 
2. Government-Regulated Private Health Insurance 
In response to this healthcare quandary, President Obama 
signed into law the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA),148 which hopes to reform the public and private provision 
of health insurance in the United States and cover an additional 
32 million people in public and private programs.  More 
specifically, the ACA will require that an essential health 
benefits package be offered by qualified health benefit plans, 
which must include specific categories of benefits, certain cost-
sharing standards, and provide certain levels of coverage.149  
However, essential health benefits are contingent upon whether 
a health benefit plan is grandfathered or non-grandfathered, and 
insured or self-insured.  A self-insured plan is one in which the 
employer pays for each claim out of pocket compared to an 
insured plan, where the company would pay a fixed premium to 
an insurance company.150  A grandfathered plan allows 
 
ADMIN., available at http://www.ssa.gov/oact/trsum/ (last visited Apr. 29, 2015). 
 147.  Id.  
 148. . Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 
119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) (ACA). 
 149. . Paul M. Secunda, The Forgotten Employee Benefit Crisis: Multiemployer 
Benefit Plans on the Brink, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 77, 98 (2011) (citing CH 
EDITORIAL STAFF, CCH’S LAW, EXPLANATION, AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT 
PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT ¶ 2205, at 969 (2010)). 
 150.  See Self-Insured Group Health Plans, SELF-INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF 
AMERICA, INC. (last visited Apr. 29, 2015), 
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companies who had a health benefit plan in place prior to March 
23, 2010 to maintain their plan from that time so long as they do 
not encounter a trigger event that would force it to lose that 
status, such as (1) significantly cutting or reducing benefits, (2) 
significantly raising deductibles or co-pays, or (3) lowering 
employer contributions.151  A non-grandfathered plan would be 
one that was instituted after March 23, 2010, or one that faced a 
status-changing event.152  The biggest similarities between 
grandfathered and non-grandfathered plans are that (1) the 
waiting period before coverage is effective cannot exceed ninety 
days, (2) there are no dollar limits on essential health benefits, 
and (3) there are no pre-existing condition limits for 
participants, no matter their age.153  The key differences are that 
grandfathered plans (1) do not have to cover ten essential health 
benefits (EHBs) for individuals and insured smaller employers 
(less than fifty employees starting in 2016), (2) can deny women 
and children immediate access to gynaecological and pediatric 
care, and (3) do not have to provide immunizations and 
preventive care on a first dollar basis.154 
State-based and federal-based American Health Benefit 
Exchanges (“Exchanges”) were established starting in 2014.155  
 
http://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 (answering the “what is a self-
insured health plan?” question). 
 151.  See Grandfathered Status Fact Sheet, CIGNA, 
http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/grandfathered-
plan-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Oct. 7, 2014) (listing a variety of trigger events that 
would change an employer’s status). 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  The Association for Convenience & Fuel Retailing, Overview of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act: What Small Business NACS Members need to 
Know About Obamacare, NACS 4, 
http://www.nacsonline.com/advocacy/ComplianceResources/Documents/HealthcareS
mallBusinesses.pdf (last visited Apr. 29, 2015); see also Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, 
Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan? The Limits of Grandfathering Under the 
Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 766-67 (2011). 
 154.  Id.; see also COLLEEN E. MEDILL, INTRODUCTION TO EMPLOYEE BENEFITS 
LAW: POLICY AND PRACTICE 367-68 (4th ed. 2015) (taking each new requirement for 
non-grandfathered plans in turn, noting that they are additional requirements 
beyond the scope of grandfathered plans). 
 155.  See Building the Health Insurance Marketplace, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/american-health-benefit-exchanges.aspx 
(updated May 19, 2014) (“The Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires that health 
insurance exchanges be established in every state by January 1, 2014. The central 
purpose of these new Marketplaces is to enable low and moderate income 
individuals, and small employers to obtain affordable health coverage. Individuals 
and small business will be able to purchase private health insurance through a 
variety of insurance Marketplace models throughout the United States.” 
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Small Business Health Options Program (SHOP) Exchanges, on 
the other hand, will only become fully functional in 2015.156  
Through the Exchanges, individuals may purchase qualified 
health coverage.157  Even though there are conditions to such 
programs, they leave open some general flexibility for people 
when choosing health insurance (including the benefits package 
itself, along with price variations) because they are not directly 
mandated by the government.158  Additionally, effective in full at 
the beginning of 2016,159 ACA began operating on a play-or-pay 
system, meaning that large employers (those with at least fifty 
full-time employees working thirty or more hours per week) 
must either provide 95% of their full-time employees “minimum 
essential coverage” or face a penalty.160  The penalty is to help 
employees receive health benefits on federal or state health 
exchanges (starting in 2016, the penalty will be $2,000 per 
employee, for every employee beyond the first thirty, for large 
employers that fail to offer minimum essential coverage to 95% 
 
 156.  See Christine Vestal, Health Law May Benefit More Small Businesses in the 
Fall, Kaiser Health News (Aug. 28, 2014), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2014/August/28/Health-Law-May-Benefit-
More-Small-Businesses-In-The-Fall.aspx (citing the Obama administration’s decision 
to postpone Oct. 1, 2014, nationwide launch because it needed to fix “serious 
technical problems with the exchanges.”). 
 157.  Sam Solomon, Health Exchange Federalism: Striking the Balance Between 
State Flexibility and Consumer Protection in ACA Implementation, 34 CARDOZO 2073, 
2074 (2013). 
 158.  See Evi Heilbrunn, Wisconsin Health Insurance, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REPORT, http://health.usnews.com/health-insurance/wisconsin (last updated June 12, 
2014) (using Wisconsin’s system as an example and comparing government-approved 
plans compared to private market health plans – noting price as the biggest 
difference).   
 159.  Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, CIGNA, 
http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/about-cigna/informed-on-reform/employer-
mandate-fact-sheet.pdf?WT.z_nav=health-care-reform%2Femployer-
mandate%3BBody%3BRead%20the%20Employer%20Mandate%20Fact%20Sheet 
(last visited May 4, 2015); see Diving In to the Affordable Care Act’s “Pay or Play” 
Provisions, Carr, Riggs & Ingram (last updated July 2013), 
http://www.cricpa.com/AffordableCareActsPayOrPlayProvisions.aspx?mobile=1 
(citing the updated implementation date of the employer shared-responsibility 
(“play-or-pay”) provision – moving by one year from Jan. 1, 2014 to Jan. 1, 2015). 
Transitional relief granted by the federal government in February 2014 will mean 
that the employer is gradually implemented. See also MEDILL supra note 154, at 375 
(explaining the structure of the $2,000 penalty for non-compliance). 
 160.  See Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, supra note 159; but see Roberton 
Williams, Good and Bad News About the ACA Penalty Tax, FORBES (June 12 2014, 
10:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2014/06/12/good-and-bad-news-
about-the-aca-penalty-tax/ (talking about the ramifications of the penalty, but most 
importantly noting that millions will try to avoid payments altogether).     
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of their full-time workers).161  There is also a $3,000 “free rider” 
penalty per employee if the health insurance offered by 
employers is not considered “affordable,” which means that 
employee contributions constitute more than 9.5% of annual 
household income or the employer does not pay for at least 60% 
of the cost (minimal actuarial value) of the health insurance 
provided.162  Moreover, very large employers, those with more 
than two hundred employees, will eventually be required to 
automatically enroll employees into health insurance plans 
offered by the employer (though employees may opt out of 
coverage).163 
The so-called ACA “individual mandate,” which requires all 
Americans to be covered by some form of health insurance or 
face tax penalties, recently survived legal constitutional 
challenges brought against it by conservative opponents.164  On 
the other hand, a planned, mandatory expansion of Medicaid 
was found unconstitutional and individual states have the right 
to stay in the old Medicaid program without jeopardizing their 
previous Medicaid funding.165  Some are also pushing to expand 
Medicare coverage to all individuals, referred to as the “single 
 
 161.  See Pub. L. No. 111-146, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also MEDILL, supra note 
154, at 357. 
 162.  See Emily Maltby, What the Health Care Decision Means for Your Small 
Business, Wall St. J. (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230356150457749458238182518
6 (answering the question about “unaffordable” coverage and $3,000 per employee 
penalty);  see also MEDILL, supra note 154, at 378 (stating that the penalty is in 
place because if the plan is unaffordable, then an employee would be better served by 
buying “an individual health insurance policy through the Exchange system using 
premium assistance tax credits”); see also Paul Secunda, Employee Benefits Law; 
Policy and Practice.  
 163.  See Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); see also MEDILL, supra note 
154, at 370 (citing the opt-out provision but also that if the employer offers more 
than one plan, a default plan may be chosen for the auto-enrollment). 
 164.  National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 
2067 (2012). For the most part, ACA was held to be constitutional by the US 
Supreme Court in Sebelius. Certain provisions which would have required states to 
spend more on Medicaid were struck down as unconstitutional in violation of the US 
Constitution’s Spending Power Clause. See id. at 2607 (“Nothing in our opinion 
precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act  to expand the 
availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply 
with the conditions on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States 
that choose not to participate in that new program by taking away their existing 
Medicaid funding.”). 
 165.  Id. at 2365 (holding that “the threat to withhold a large amount of funds 
from one program ‘leaves the States with no real option but to acquiesce [in a newly 
created program],’ The Chief Justice concludes, the Medicaid expansion is 
unconstitutionally coercive.”). 
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payer” model.166  In such a system, Medicare would provide a 
national baseline of healthcare coverage for all Americans.167  
This proposal has absolutely no chance of passing through 
Congress, given the polarized environment.  On the conservative 
side, a group of Republican Senators have proposed a plan which 
would replace “the current open-ended, fee-for-service Medicare 
with enrollment of seniors in the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Plan (FEHBP).”168  The FEHBP “offers an array of 
privately-run health insurance plans.”169  But that plan has gone 
nowhere in Congress.170 
III. SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFIT SYSTEM IN THE 
NETHERLANDS 
In this Part, we will describe the development of the Dutch 
social protection system.  Subsequently, the various risks will be 
outlined in the same order as in Part II. 
During World War II, several plans were made for a better 
world after the war, in reaction to the economic crisis in the 
1930s and the effects it had on society. This also was the case in 
the United Kingdom, where the Dutch government was in exile 
during the war. In the UK, a commission chaired by the civil 
servant William Beveridge, developed a blueprint for a future 
 
 166.  See What is Single Payer? PHYSICIANS FOR A NAT’L HEALTH REFORM (2015), 
http://www.pnhp.org/facts/what-is-single-payer (explaining the single payer system 
of healthcare, and asking for assistance and support in establishing such a system in 
the United States).   
 167  See Jacob S. Hacker, Better Medicine: Fixing the Left’s Healthcare 
Prescription, SLATE (Oct. 10, 2006), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/medical_examiner/2006/10/better_
medicine.html (“Paul Krugman has written a steady stream of pieces calling for a 
single public insurer like Medicare. Liberal stalwarts Sen. Ted Kennedy and Rep. 
John Dingell   who've each proposed various complicated compromise plans in the 
past   have teamed up to introduce the Medicare for All Act, which would, in 
Kennedy's words, “expand Medicare over the next decade to cover every citizen   
from birth to the end of life.”). In other words, such legislation would do nothing less 
than enact European-style national health insurance.  
 168.  Tom Curry, In Risky Election-Year Move Republicans Offer Medicare 
Alternatives, NBC NEWS (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/03/15/10704915-in-risky-election-year-
move-republicans-offer-medicare-alternatives?chromedomain=usnews.   
 169. .See id. Another conservative proposal would “raise the Medicare eligibility 
age (to 67, not 70) and subsidize seniors so they could purchase private insurance 
plans.” Id. 
 170.  GOP Plans for Medicare, Health Reform Repeal Draw Scrutiny, KAISER 
HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 18, 2012), http://kaiserhealthnews.org/morning-
breakout/medicare-republicans-ryan/. 
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social security system titled the Beveridge Report.171 It leveraged 
the term “social security” from the Social Security Act adopted 
shortly before the war in the United States in 1935.172 The 
Beveridge Report proposed that the future social security system 
should be universal in that it would cover all categories of the 
population.173  Inspired by this report, the Dutch government 
established the Commission Van Rhijn, which had the task of 
sketching the foundations of the future Dutch social security 
system.174  In its report, Sociale Zekerheid (Social Security),175 
the Commission proposed a new legal basis for the system, 
which turned out to be very important for the development of 
Dutch social security, as we will see below. Under this scheme, 
the state was responsible for social security and the protection 
against poverty for all of its members (now replaced by the term 
“citizen”).176  The provision of universal social security, in turn, 
required that individuals do all that they reasonably could to 
protect themselves against poverty through their own efforts.177 
This was an important change after the previous approach, 
where the state was reticent in interfering in society and 
providing income protection.  The new approach was widely 
endorsed, and the responsibility of the state for guaranteeing 
social welfare was laid down in the Constitution.178 
The text of legal basis accepted by the Dutch government 
and parliament made it possible to extend the scope of social 
protection beyond the category of employees, and required the 
state to be responsible for the whole population, since it now 
 
 171.  See Beveridge, supra note 21.  
 172.  See infra at 316.   
 173.  Beveridge, supra note 21. 
 174.  The Dutch Commission Van Rhijn, Commission for Social Security Report, 
THE HAGUE NATIONAL ARCHIVES (Mar. 26, 1943) (establishing general guidelines for 
the future development of social insurance in the Netherlands). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id.  
 178.  In the Constitution of 1814 it was mentioned that the poor were the concern 
of the government. Currently, Article 20 of the present Constitution gives a broader 
responsibility:  
It shall be the concern of the authorities to secure the means of subsistence of the 
population and to achieve the distribution of wealth. 2. Rules concerning entitlement 
to social security shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. 3. Dutch nationals resident 
in the Netherlands who are unable to provide for themselves shall have a right, to be 
regulated by Act of Parliament, to aid from the authorities.  Grondwet voor het 
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 augustus 1815, Stb. 45, zoals deze wet laatstelijk 
laatstelijk is gewijzigd bij de Wet van 25 februari 1999, Stb. 133, 134 en 135 
(Constitution of the Netherlands, hereinafter Gw). 
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refers to all “members of the society.”  This led to the 
introduction of insurance schemes covering all residents, 
including the self-employed and persons not working.  The first 
of these schemes was the Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW 
General Old-Age Pensions Law), which came into force on 
January 1, 1957.179  Soon after this date, two national insurance 
schemes were adopted—widow’s benefits (survivor’s scheme) and 
family’s benefits.180  Both the old age scheme and the survivor’s 
benefit scheme provide for flat-rate benefits.181 
Additionally, an Unemployment Benefits Act (called 
Werkloosheidswet) was passed in 1949.182  The unemployment 
scheme insured all employees against unemployment, providing 
a benefit up to 80% of the previous wage (up to a ceiling), 
payable for six months.183  This was administered, as was 
regulated in this Act, by bedrijfsverenigingen, the associations of 
employees’ and employers’ representatives mentioned earlier.184 
In 1966, Parliament adopted the Wet op de 
arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering (WAO Law Relating to 
Insurance against Incapacity for Work).185  The WAO, a 
disability law, was also administered by the 
bedrijfsverenigingen, as was regulated in this Act.186 
As for health care, in the 1970s, Parliament adopted health 
care regulations limited to employees with an income below the 
statutory ceiling.187  In addition, Parliament adopted a national 
 
 179.  Algeme Ouderdomswet (AOW), HISTORIEK, (Oct. 12, 2009) available at 
historiek.net/algemene-ouderdomswet-aow/5966/ (in Dutch); see also Art. 20 AOW 
(May 31, 1956), available at 
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBV0001560/geldigheidsdatum_30-08-2014 (in Dutch); 
see generally http://www.overheid.nl for text of all Acts, in Dutch.  
 180.  Office of Retirement and Disability Policy, Social Security Programs 
Throughout the World: Europe 2012, U.S. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., (last accessed Apr. 29, 
2015), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2012-
2013/europe/netherlands.html. 
 181.  Id.; Wim van Oorschot and Cees  Boos, Nagelaten betrekkingen in de sociale 
verzekering. Terug naar af?, De Gemeenschap is aansprakelijk…’ 100 jaar sociale 
verzekering 1901-2001, 225 (Vermande, 2001).  
 182.  De Werkloosheidswet Nov. 1949 Stb. 1949, 423.  A brief description of the 
law can be found at, 
http://www.stvda.nl/~/media/Files/Stvda/Brochures/1950_1959/1952/19520400.ashx.  
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Wet op de arbeidsongeschiktheidsverzekering, Stb. 1966, 84 (Law on 
Disability Insurance), available at http://www.overheid.nl (in Dutch).   
 186.   Art. 66 WAO (Disability Act). 
 187.  Ziekenfondswet, Stb. 1964, 392 (Sickness Fund Act); see also MEASURING 
UP: IMPROVING HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE IN OECD COUNTRIES 119 (OECD 
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insurance scheme for the high medical costs that employees and 
private insurers were believed to be not able to bear, for 
example: long-term hospital care or stay in nursing homes.188 
Thus, after World War II, the Dutch system of social 
protection increased considerably, as economic growth after the 
war enabled the government to absorb the costs of these 
schemes.  However, when economic growth slowed down in the 
1970s (oil crisis) and 1980s (structural problems requiring 
important enterprise restructuring), the number of benefit 
recipients grew steadily while the funds decreased.189 
In the 1990s, policy makers became aware that social 
security acts enabled employers and others to also use them for 
unintended purposes that were deemed no longer desirable by 
the legislature.190  For instance, if an employer had a conflict 
with an employee, it was a cheap solution to send this employee 
home “sick” because the wage costs were reimbursed by the 
sickness benefit fund.191  To some extent, such an employee 
would indeed often feel ill (i.e., stressed), but such situations 
could, in principle, be solved by giving the employee other work 
to do or getting that employee a colleague to assist her or him.  
However, since the Sickness Benefit Act was bearing the costs, 
there was no financial incentive for the employer to find a 
solution.192  This perpetuated a cycle wherein the employee 
would remain in the scheme for a long time, believing she or he 
was really ill until she or he was finally deemed disabled.  For 
this reason, “activation” became the new term: the system was to 
activate people to make as little use of the benefit as possible by 
encouraging (and forcing) them to take responsibility for 
themselves.193 
Additionally, disability benefits were paid out more 
generously than intended.194 In order to find a compensation for 
 
Publications, 2002). 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See generally Marcel Einerhand et al., SICKNESS AND INVALIDITY 
ARRANGEMENTS (VUGA, 1995).  
 190.  See generally Belang en Beleid. Naar een verantwoordelijke uitvoering van 
de werknemersverzekeringen, (SDU-uitgeverij, 1994) (explaining the distribution of 
responsibilities of benefit administration; see also Sanneke Kuipers, THE CRISIS 
IMPERATIVE: CRISIS RHETORIC AND WELFARE STATE REFORM IN BELGIUM AND THE 
NETHERLANDS IN THE EARLY 1990S, 131-132 (Amsterdam University Press, 2006).    
 191.  Id. at 134. 
 192.  Id.  
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id.  
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victims of mass dismissals in Dutch workplaces in the 1970s and 
1980s, in a considerable number of cases disability benefits were 
awarded to persons who became redundant.195 
These examples show that the costs of particular decisions 
could be shifted to the benefit system.  A consensus emerged 
that responsibilities had to be re-ordered196 and that those who 
could influence the risk of becoming disabled should be given 
incentives to reduce that risk.197  Also the employers’ and 
employees’ associations did not feel the necessary economic 
incentives to reduce reliance on the benefit system.  In order to 
end the influence by those who do not have to bear the costs of 
the decisions, the employers’ and employees’ associations 
(organized in the bedrijfsverenigingen) were completely removed 
from benefit administration.198  After a short period in which it 
was thought that the system should be privatized (i.e. 
administered by private insurance companies), the government 
decided that the system should become public, with strict 
supervision and control by the Minister of Social Affairs.199  One 
major reason for coming to this conclusion was that assessing a 
person’s incapacity for work was such an essential element of 
receiving benefits that public responsibility should be 
maintained.200  Therefore, the administration could not be left to 
private companies, especially because they would have a conflict 
of interest in wanting to reduce benefit costs.201  For this reason, 
the Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV) 
(benefit administration employees’ schemes) was established.202  
 
 195.  Id. at 135.  
 196.  See Verantwoordelijkheidsverdeling sociale zekerheid, SER, (Jan. 1994) 
https://www.ser.nl/~/media/files/internet/publicaties/overige/1990_1999/1994/b01080.
ashx.   The Social Economic Council is a tripartite (i.e. consisting of representatives 
of employers and employees organizations and independent experts appointed by the 
minister of social affairs) with the task (inter alia) to advise the government on socio-
economic issues. Id.  
 197.  See Belang en beleid, supra note 154.  
 198.  Wet uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, Stb. 2001, 264 (Act on the 
administration of work and income). 
 199.  R.J. van der Veen, et al., L’histoire se répète? Honderd jaar 
uitvoeringsorganisatie sociale verzekeringen, De gemeenschap is 
aansprakelijk…Honderd jaar sociale verzekering, Koninklijke vermande, 2001.  
 200.  See id. at 78; see generally P.S. Fluit, Verzekeringen van solidariteit, 
Netherlands, Kluwer, 2001; see also Frans Pennings, Dutch Social Security Law in 
an International Context, Kluwer Law International, 2002 (providing a general 
overview of the system) 
 201.  R. J. van der Veen, supra note 200. 
 202.  Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen 29 Nov. 2001, Stb. 
2001, 624 (SUWI). 
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Currently, this is a national organization that administers the 
disability, sickness, and unemployment benefit schemes (as well 
as a few other minor schemes).203 
In addition to the schemes mentioned above, there is a 
general public assistance act that provides for a subsistence 
income, which, for couples, is at the level of the statutory 
minimum wage.204  As of July 2014, the gross amount is $ 
1,855.205  For single persons, the amount is in principle 70% of 
this (and for single parents, it is 90%).206  These subsistence 
benefits take the income of the person concerned and that of a 
spouse (or equated person) into account, as well as any capital 
above a certain threshold.207 
A. OLD-AGE PENSIONS 
1. The National Old-Age Pension Act 
The Algemene Ouderdomswet (General Old Age Pension 
Act)208 was already mentioned in the previous section; it is the 
Act, introduced shortly after the Second World War as part of 
the project to introduce schemes protecting the full population, 
not only workers.209  Benefits are flat-rate and are at the 
subsistence level (the same rates as discussed under the Public 
assistance act, see previous section).210  The benefits are 
financed on the basis of contributions paid by all residents, 
depending on whether they have an income (those who do not 
have an income are protected in the same way as contribution 
payers).211 
This general system also provides protection to those who 
have never worked, those who have large gaps in their careers, 
and those who are self-employed.  Since the old-age benefit rates 
and the subsistence benefits are basically the same, pensioners, 
in principle, do not have to rely on public assistance. 
 
 203.  Wet uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, supra note 199. It is regulated 
by the new Act.  See Wet structuur uitvoeringsorganisatie werk en inkomen, supra 
note 202. 
 204.  Art. 3:21 WWB (Public Assistance Act). 
 205.  Id. 
 206.  Id. 
 207.  Art. 31-34 WWB. 
 208.  Algemene ouderdomswet, Stb. 1956, 281 (General Old Age Pension Act). 
 209.  Art. 6 AOW. 
 210.  Art. 9 AOW. 
 211.  Art. 82-83 WFSV (Act on financing of social insurance schemes). 
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Benefits are financed on a PAYG basis.212  Since the greying 
of the population raised concerns on financing in the future, the 
pension age was raised in 2014.213  The pension age had been 
sixty-five for both women and men alike.214  In the future, it will 
gradually rise to sixty-seven; further increases are possible if 
figures show that life expectancy has increased further.215  It is 
now generally believed that the system is sustainable because of 
this dynamic increase of pension age, which is not viewed as 
unreasonable now that people at the age of sixty-five are, in 
general, much healthier than when the act was adopted in 
1957.216 
Survivors’ benefits fall under a separate act, the Algemene 
nabestaandenwet (General Survivors’ Benefits Act).217  This act 
provides for benefits comparable to those of the AOW.218  
Benefits take the income of the survivor into account, and only 
certain categories of survivors are eligible for benefits (born 
before 1950, or being partially disabled or having children under 
eighteen).219 
2. Supplementary Old-Age Pensions 
Although the Old Age Benefits Act has an important 
function to protect all pensioners against poverty (with benefits 
that are relatively high, compared to other European countries), 
these benefits only partially compensate the loss of income for 
those who previously earned higher incomes, since benefits are 
flat-rate only.  For this reason, employers’ and employees’ 
organizations made arrangements in many sectors to establish 
occupational pensions.  Because of the minimum level of the 
statutory pensions and the absence of statutory earnings-related 
pensions, the expanse of supplementary pensions in the 
 
 212.  Federation of the Dutch Pension Funds, Collectivity Solidarity: the evolution 
and position of collective pensions in the Netherlands, 22 (The Hague, 2011), 
www.pensionfederatie.nl?Document/Publicaties/English%20publications/VoorsElkaa
r_EN.pdf; see also Art. 81-83 WFSV. 
 213.   Joris Beermaert and Corine Hoekstra, Raising the real retirement age, THE 
ACTUARY (May 8, 2014), available at www.theactuary.com/features/2014/05/raising-
the-real-retirement-age/; Art. 7 AOW; Stb. 2013, 316. 
 214.  Art. 7 AOW. 
 215.  Art. 7a AOW.  
 216.   See Beermaert, supra note 213. 
 217.  Algemene nabestaandenwet, Stb. 1995, 690. 
 218.  Art. 17 ANW. 
 219.  Art. 14 ANW.  
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Netherlands is relatively large compared to countries that have 
a statutory earnings-related system.220 
The supplementary pension system is based on the principle 
that employers and employees have the primary responsibility 
for the establishment of pension provisions; there is no 
obligation to make a pension provision.  However, once an 
employer has made a pension commitment to his employees, this 
commitment must be implemented according to the conditions 
prescribed in the Pension Act, and is also subject to the 
protections built into the act. 221  The main safeguard is the rule 
that pension commitments must be financed on the basis of 
capital funding, and that the reserves must be placed outside the 
employer’s company through one of the following: (1) by joining 
an industry-wide pension fund; (2) by establishing a company-
pension fund; or (3) by entering into an agreement with an 
insurance provider.222  The safeguard provides protection in case 
the company goes bankrupt.223 
An agreement between the employer (or employers’ 
organization) and employees’ organizations defines the portions 
of the pension contributions that must be paid by the employer 
and the employee (in some cases the employer pays all 
contributions).  If an employee changes jobs, she or he has the 
legal right to transfer his or her pension rights to the fund 
affiliated with the new employer.224  As a result, there is no gap 
in the pension record. 
Although employers are not obligated to make pension 
commitments to their employees, the vast majority of 
employees—about 90%—are now covered by an occupational 
pension scheme.225  The Minister of Social Affairs has the power 
to impose mandatory participation in a pension fund within a 
given industry at the request of employers’ and employees’ 
 
 220.  See Mies Westerveld, Keuzes van gisteren…eeen blauwdruk voor morgen?: 
Honderd jaar socialeverzekeringspensioenen in de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland, Groot- 
Brittannië en Nederland (SDU, 1994).  
 221.  Pensioenwet, Stb. 2006, 705 (Pension Act). 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Sibylle J.M. Reichert, The Dutch Pension System: an overview of the key 
aspects, 11, 29, DUTCH ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRY-WIDE PENSION FUNDS, available at 
http://www.pensioenfederatie.nl/Document/Publicaties/English%20publications/Nede
rlandse_pensioensysteem_Engelstalige_versie.pdf. 
 225.  See generally Rijksoverheid, ‘Opbouw pensioenstelsel,’ Pensioen, 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/opbouw-pensioenstelsel (last 
accessed Apr. 15, 2015); Reichert, supra note 224. 
PENNINGS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:30 AM 
352 BENEFITS & SOCIAL WELFARE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16.2 
organizations that have jointly set up a pension fund for that 
branch.226 
Since the contents of the pensions are defined in 
agreements between the employers’ and employees’ 
representatives, there are no general rules on the level of 
pensions applicable to all schemes.  However, the tax rules 
define limits for the contributions that can be deducted from 
taxes, which is extremely influential on the pension rules that 
are made. Most schemes are defined benefit schemes, in which 
the employee is promised a pension that is a ratio of the wage 
earned during his or her lifetime.  However, more recently, due 
to the financial crisis and problems with the pension funds, the 
pension promise does not mention the exact amount of the 
pension anymore. 
In the 1990s, pension funds ran into trouble because 
pension obligations and costs increased, while fewer 
contributions were being paid and capital market interest rates 
and returns on investments dropped sharply.227  Consequently, 
the reserves of the funds decreased, and their solvency eroded.228  
In order to deal with this situation, the then supervisory body 
tightened up the regulations for pension funds and intensified 
its supervision.229  The funds had to take measures to increase 
their reserves.230  One such measure was the shift in most funds 
from pensions calculated on the final wage to pensions based on 
the average wage earned during the career (although they are 
still defined benefit plans).231 
 
 226.  On the basis of the Wet verplichte deelname bedrijfstakpensioenfonds, Stb. 
2000, 628 (Act on compulsory participation in a pension fund). 
 227.  Federation of the Dutch Pension Funds, supra note 213, at 30-31; see Igor 
Guardiancich, The Netherlands: current pension system: first assessment of reform 
outcomes and output, (OSE, 2010), available at 
www.ose.be/Filed/publication/2010/country_reports_pension/OSE_2010_CRpension_
TheNetherlands.pdf. 
 228.  See Robbert van het Kaar, Dutch pension funds face serious challenges, 
EURWORK), http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2011/01/articles/nl1101039i.htm 
(last updated May 2, 2011) (stating “Rising premiums and the option of 
supplementary deposit obligations are increasingly prompting employers to make 
employees responsible for pension risks, in part or in full”). 
 229.  See Mark den Hollander and Tjitsger Hulshoff, Hogere buffereisen voor 
pensioenfondsen kunnen knellen, MEJUDICE (Dec. 28, 2011), 
http://www.mejudice.nl/artikelen/detail/hogere-buffereisen-voor-pensioenfondsen-
kunnen-knellen; Besluit financieel toetsingskader pensioenfondsen, Stb. 2006, 710. 
 230.  Hollander, supra note 229. 
 231.  Guardiancich, supra note 227. Independent pension experts are already for 
a long time in favor of average wage systems. J.C.N. Kennis, Lex Meijdam, & Harrie 
Verbon, Van eindloon naar middelloon, 82 (4128) 861-864 (Economisch Statistische 
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 In July 2014, the government finally came up with a 
proposal that allowed pension funds to take more time to acquire 
the necessary capital, but the reserves have to be bigger than 
what was required before.232  Whether this solution will be 
sufficient to shore up the pension system, as well as what effects 
it will ultimately have, remains to be seen.233  Defined 
contribution plans are sometimes proposed, but there is little 
popularity. 
B. THE NEW DISABILITY BENEFITS ACT OF 2004 
The introductory section discussed how the continuous 
increase of new disability benefit claimants was a big problem 
for the government.234  Measures like redefining the concept of 
disability and amending the level did not change this 
situation.235  As a result, a new structural approach was 
introduced via the Wet Werk en Inkomen Naar Arbeidsvermogen 
(WIA), the new Disability Benefits Act, adopted in 2004.236  This 
approach stressed the priority of work over receiving benefits, 
and for this purpose, the act introduced several new 
instruments.237  In addition, the changes to the Sickness 
Benefits Act were seen as vital in reducing the number of new 
disability claimants, since the longer people remain ill, the more 
likely it is that they will become a disability benefit claimant; we 
will discuss the sickness benefits below (under C). 
The new Disability Benefits Act makes a distinction 
between persons who are permanently disabled to at least 80% 
(the permanently fully disabled) and those who are not 
permanently disabled, or who are permanently disabled to a 
 
Berichten, 1997), available at http://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/200922/vaniendl,pdf. 
 232.  Legal Alert: New bill to amend financial assessment framework for pension 
funds, DE BRAUW, BLACKSTONE, WESTBROEK (July 9, 2014), 
http://www.debrauw.com/wp-content/uploads/NEWS%20-
%20LEGAL%20ALERTS/Pensions/2014/New-bill-to-amend-financial-assessment-
framework-for-pension-funds.pdf.   
 233.  Wet aanpassing financieel toetsingskader, Stb. 2014, 567 (Act on adjusting 
the financial framework for pensions). 
 234.  See infra section III. 
 235.   De wegwijzer naar informatie en diensten van alle overheden, 22.730, 1992-
1993. 
 236.  The Act was preceded by the report of Adviescommissie 
arbeidsongeschiktheid, Werk maken van arbeidsgeschiktheid (2001) avalaible at 
http://docs.szw.nl/pdf/35/2002/35_2002_3_2406.pdf.   
 237.  Barend Barentsen, Arbeidsongeschiktheid: aansprakelijkheid, bescherming 
en compensatie (Kluwer, 2003). 
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lesser extent than 80% (the partially disabled).238 The 
assessment of incapacity of work is done by assessing what a 
person can still earn with the remaining capacities in any work 
available on the labor market. This (theoretical) income is 
compared with the previous income, and thus the level of 
incapacity is calculated. Thus, a very broad range of possible 
work is taken into account (not only suitable work). As a result, 
the system is very strict. 
According to the new act, the permanently fully disabled 
have the right to a generous disability benefit because measures 
for getting them back to work are not considered relevant.239  
The level of this benefit is 75% of their previous wage.240 
The partially disabled are subject to conditions and rules 
meant to reinforce their re-integration back into work.241  In 
order to be eligible for disability benefits, they have to be more 
than 35% disabled.242  They receive a wage-related benefit if 
they satisfy certain conditions relating to their employment 
history; the duration of the benefit is contingent on the duration 
of their employment history. 243  This benefit is 70% of their 
previous wages.244  After the right to this benefit has expired (or 
if the claimant is not entitled to this benefit because of an 
insufficient work record), a so-called “wage supplement benefit” 
is payable, on condition that the claimant actually earns an 
income of at least half the residual earning capacity.245  The 
latter capacity is calculated by looking at the income the person 
can earn with any kind of work that he or she can still do (so not 
only their own previous work or suitable work).246  This is a 
theoretical assessment, so it is not relevant whether there are 
 
 238.  The assessment is done by comparing the physical and psychological 
deficiencies due to medical reasons and a database of job descriptions (regardless of 
whether there are vacancies) with the purpose to determine how much a person can 
still earn. The more a person can earn, the lower the disability rate. See more on this 
method at Schattingsbesluit arbeidsongeschiktheidswetten, Stb. 2000, 307 (Decree on 
Assessment for Disability Acts). 
 239.  These are often called re-integration measures. 
 240.  Up to a ceiling, which is currently 4137 euro a month. The maximum benefit 
is 75% of this amount (which is gross income), see Art. 17 WFSV. 
 241.  Art. 29 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 242.  Art. 54 WIA  (The New Disability Act). 
 243.  Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act). The rules for entitlement and 
duration of this benefit follow those of the Unemployment Benefits Act, which is 
discussed in more detail below. 
 244.  See id; see also Art. 81-83 WFSV. 
 245.  Art. 59-101 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 246.  Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
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employment vacancies.247  What is relevant is that the claimant 
realizes at least half the income she or he can theoretically 
earn.248  Until this point, disability schemes did not have a 
connection with the actual income a person earns. The resulting 
benefit in this case is 70% of the difference between the 
individual’s previous earnings and his residual earning 
capacity.249 Actual income is received in addition to this.250  
Thus, increases in income do not lead to a lower benefit, making 
it attractive to work as much as one can.  In other words, it is 
attractive to work as much as possible, since income is not 
deducted from the benefit received. 
The claimant who, upon expiration of his or her wage-
related benefit, does not satisfy the condition that he or she 
earns at least 50% of the person’s remaining earning capacity is 
instead eligible for a low benefit.251  In the case of full disability, 
this is 70% of the statutory minimum wage.252  In cases of 
partial disability, the benefit depends on the incapacity rate.253  
Persons who are incapacitated to a level of less than 35% are not 
eligible for a benefit.254  It was the view of the legislature that 
their incapacity rate is so low that they should be able to 
work.255 
Currently, this constitutes a consistent approach, 
elaborated upon via new specific rules aimed at reducing 
sickness and disability claims.  Under this approach, during the 
sickness period, employer and employee must do everything 
possible for the latter to stay at or return to work.  The hope is 
that most workers can still do adjusted or other types of work in 
a modified workplace, if necessary.  If the employee is not able to 
earn at least 65% of the previously earned wage after two years, 
the disability benefit scheme encourages the beneficiary to keep 
 
 247.  See id. 
 248.  Thus, if a person is supposed to have an earning capacity of 1,000 euro per 
month, he or she must have an income from work of at least 500 euro per month in 
order to be eligible for the wage supplement. The idea behind this rule is that it must 
be made as attractive as possible for the person concerned to (re)start working or 
remain in work. Parliamentary Papers II 2004-2005, 30.034, section 3.1, available at 
http://www.overheid.nl (Explanatory Memorandum to The New Disability Benefit 
Act).  
 249.  See Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act); see also Art. 63 WIA. 
 250.  Art. 52-60 WIA. 
 251.  Art. 61 WIA. 
 252.  Id.    
 253.  Id. 
 254.  Art. 61:6 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 255.  See Barentsen, supra note 237. 
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working, and/or seek more work, as this leads to a higher 
benefit, as has been explained supra.  In evaluating reports of 
this act, it appears that the number of new entrants for benefits 
has been much lower than under the old disability act, although 
whether those who are disqualified ultimately find work is not so 
clear.256 
Employers have the discretion to opt out of the disability 
scheme, but are not obligated to do so.257  “Opting out” might not 
be an optimal term, since opting out here is limited to no longer 
having to pay contributions to the scheme.  Therefore, the term 
“own risk bearer” is generally used.258  Instead of paying 
contributions, the employer bears the financial risks of the 
disability benefits (for the partially disabled and non-
permanently disabled - Group B mentioned above) for the first 
ten years of disability.259  The decision on granting and 
terminating the right to benefits is still in the hands of the 
public benefits administration, and the statutory rules for 
benefits also apply.260  Since the employer pays the benefit, he or 
she has the advantage of paying less social security 
contributions.261  After the first ten years of benefit payments to 
a beneficiary, the benefits administration bears the 
responsibility of the costs for that person.262 
Employers may buy private insurance to bear the risk of the 
first ten years of benefit payments, and they usually do so.263  
These insurance policies are often adjusted to the individual 
enterprise concerned, and little is shared with the public about 
the conditions, prices, and uses.  This also means that the risk 
bearers are responsible for reintegration activities of the persons 
for whom they bear the risk.264  Thus, they can directly impact 
their risk, and if they succeed in getting a person back to work, 
they see the benefits of their efforts. 
 
 256.  See Boukje Cuelenaere, et al., Onderzoek evaluatie WIA (Astri, 2011), 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en 
publicaties/rapporten/2011/03/28/onderzoek-evaluatie-wia/onderzoek-evaluatie-
wia.pdf.  
 257.  Art. 82-87 WIA. 
 258.  See, e.g., id. 
 259.  Art. 82 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 260.  See Frans Pennings, Kunnen eigenrisicodragers wel hun eigen risico 
beinvloeden?, Tijdschrift recht en arbeid, 2014. 
 261.  Art. 40 WFSV. 
 262.  Art. 82 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 263.  Cuelenaere, supra note 256. 
 264.  Art. 27:6 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
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In conclusion, disability benefits give strong financial 
incentives for beneficiaries to return to work.  Employers are not 
directly involved, except when a claim is made, but they can be 
involved by deciding to bear their own risk.  In that case, the 
decisions on benefits are still made by the public benefits 
administration. 
C. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
The current Unemployment Benefits Act was adopted in 
1986.265  It provides claimants who have lost at least five 
working hours per week with an unemployment benefit.266  In 
other words, claimants do not have to be completely out of work 
in order to be considered unemployed.267 
In order to satisfy the conditions regarding previous 
employment, the claimant must have worked at least one hour a 
week as an employee in at least twenty-six of the thirty-six 
weeks immediately preceding the first day of unemployment.268  
For persons satisfying this condition, the duration of the benefit 
is three months.269  If additional conditions are fulfilled, a longer 
benefit is paid.  These rules are simply put: For each year of 
work, the benefit is prolonged for one month.270  The maximum 
period for which a benefit can be received is thirty-eight 
months.271  However, the law was changed in June 2014, and the 
maximum period during which benefits can be received will be 
reduced to twenty-four months beginning in 2015, because the 
government wants to encourage people to find work, which has 
the tangential benefit of reducing expenditures.272 
The Act imposes an obligation on the benefit administration 
(not merely a discretionary power) to sanction the beneficiary if 
she or he did not satisfy his or her obligations as defined under 
the law.273  Until this law came into force in 2006, the benefit 
 
 265.  Werkloosheidswet, Stb. 1986, 567 (Unemployment Benefits Act).  
 266.  Art. 16:1 WW. 
 267.  See generally Pennings, supra note 200. 
 268.  Art. 17 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 269.  Art. 42:1 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 270.  Art. 42:2 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 271.  Id. 
 272.  During the first ten years, one still acquires one month per year; after the 
ten years, it is half a month per year. Wet werk en zekerheid, Stb. 2014, 216 (Work 
and Security Act), 
 273.  Art. 27 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
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administration had discretionary powers to impose a sanction.274 
During the first two months, the benefit, in cases of full 
unemployment, is 75% of the daily wage.275  After this period, 
the level is 70% of the daily wage.276  A person whose benefit is 
below the applicable subsistence income277 may be eligible for a 
supplement under a subsistence benefit act.278 
Unemployment benefits can be reduced or withdrawn if a 
person is considered to have become culpably unemployed (i.e. 
can be blamed for the situation).279  Grounds for such dismissal 
include theft from the employer or violence against the employer 
and fellow employees.280  While those are just a few examples, 
they are representative of the seriousness of the offenses in 
question.  In addition, the employee is also considered culpably 
unemployed if the employment relationship has ended by, or on 
the request of, the employee, whereas continuation of the 
employment relationship would not have resulted in such 
difficulties for the employee that this continuation could not, in 
all fairness, have been demanded of her or him.281  This makes it 
clear that if an employee took the initiative to end the 
employment relationship without a good reason that person is 
culpably unemployed and benefits will be refused completely.  
Generally, if the employer took the initiative to terminate the 
employment relationship, the employee is able to obtain 
benefits.282  This approach was adopted in 2006 so that the 
mobility of workers was not blocked.283  Prior to the change, 
employees had to fight their dismissal in any case where the 
employer took the initiative since such attempt could lead, in 
theory, to continuation of the employment contract or 
reinstatement of the employee, and then no benefits had to be 
 
 274.  See generally Frans Pennings and Anita Damsteegt, De Werkloosheidswet 
(Kluwer, 2009). 
 275.  Art. 45 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 276.  See Art. 17 WFSV. 
 277.  Subsistence income is closed related to the amounts mentioned for the old 
age benefits in Art. 9 AOW. 
 278.  See Part I, See infra Part III. 
 279.  Art. 27 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 280.  Art. 24 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  Baker & McKenzie, The Netherlands 361, available at 
http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Supporting%20Your%20Bu
siness/Global%20Markets%20QRGs/Termination,%20Discrimination%20and%20Har
assment/qr_netherlands_terminationdiscriminationharassmentguide_2009.pdf.   
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paid.284 
If an employee is culpably unemployed, the UWV (the 
benefit administration) must refuse any form of unemployment 
benefit.285 It is not only in cases of culpable unemployment that 
the Werkloosheidswet provides what measures have to be taken.  
The same rules apply if the claimant does not prevent becoming 
or staying unemployed as a result of neglecting to accept 
suitable work, or by failing to obtain or to keep suitable work 
through his own fault.286  Suitable work is any work that fits a 
given employee’s strengths and skill set, unless acceptance of 
that job poses physical, mental, or social demands on that person 
that cannot be met.287  If an employee neglects to accept suitable 
work or if she or he fails to obtain suitable work through his or 
her own fault, the benefit must permanently be refused for the 
time period in which the person could have worked, if not for 
that person’s refusal to accept the work in question.288  The act 
also obligates the claimant to actively apply for work and not 
intentionally hinder the possibility of getting such work.289  The 
employee is, moreover, required to cooperate in obtaining the 
education or training deemed necessary for his or her future 
employment, or for other activities that are beneficial to his or 
her reintegration.290 
D. PROTECTION IN CASE OF SICKNESS 
In the area of sickness benefits, a new approach 
materialized with the introduction of the statutory obligation for 
employers to continue to pay wages when an employee gets sick.  
This new approach began in 1994 with the introduction of the 
rule that employers had to continue to pay wages during the 
first six weeks of illness (for small enterprises, defined by the 
law as having fewer than fifteen employees, the period was two 
weeks).291  The assumption underlying the new act was that if 
employers were responsible for income provision during 
sickness, they would check more carefully whether an employee 
 
 284.  Art. 24 WW; Art. 27 WW. 
 285.  Id. 
 286.  Id. 
 287.  Id. 
 288.  Art. 27 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 289.  Art. 24 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 290.  Art. 26 WW (Unemployment Benefits Act). 
 291.  Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzium, Stb. 1993, 750 (Sickness Absence 
(Reduction) Act). 
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was rightfully absent.292  Another anticipated effect of the new 
law was that employers would take measures to reduce the risk 
of injury or sickness caused by dangerous working conditions.293  
The construction sector, in particular, was one in which many 
measures could be taken to reduce the number, and drastic 
effects, of accidents.294  So even though there was a separate 
Health and Safety Act, the new sickness provisions encouraged 
additional efforts to prevent accidents and sickness. 
Although it is not clear whether the obligation for employers 
to pay wages in case of sickness really had the desired effect, two 
years later, the employer’s responsibility to pay wages to ill 
employees was extended to a period of fifty-two weeks.295  This 
extension occurred through a law that amended, inter alia, the 
Civil Code in order to give ill employees the legal right to 70% of 
their wages for that 52-week period.296  In 2004, the period was 
extended to 104 weeks.297  In collective agreements, which cover 
90% of the Dutch workforce, the statutory required wage is often 
supplemented to cover the full wage.298  This additional coverage 
varies from agreement to agreement.299 
This process of replacing the right to sickness benefits with 
a statutory obligation for employers to pay wages to ill 
employees (henceforth “sick pay”) is sometimes called the 
privatization of the Sickness Benefits Act, although it is not 
actually a privatization.300  Still, the employer is entirely 
responsible for the costs, and although the Civil Code provides 
strict rules, an employer can adopt supplementary obligations 
for the employee, such as the timeframe within which the 
 
 292.  Babara Hofman & Frans Pennings, Privatisering en activering in de 
Nederlandse sociale zekerheid en solidariteit – een international perspectief, 
(Deventer, 2013). 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  This could be accomplished with stronger rules such as the enforcement 
helmets, enforced shoes and protection barriers for workers at high-level sites. 
Additionally, a policy to avoid sickness caused by  stress or conflicts at work could 
contribute to lower costs. 
 295.  Wet Verlenging loondoorbetaling bij ziekte, Stb. 1996, 142 (Sickness Act). 
 296.  Id. 
 297.  Art. 7:629 BW. 
 298.  See Fase W. et al, Sociale zekerheid: privaat of publiek? (Kluwer, 1994) 
(describing the privatization principles that apply to the Sickness Benefit Act). 
 299.  Because of these variations, it is difficult to say how many workers were 
thus guaranteed 100% of their former wage.  
 300.  For a description of the various dimensions of the privatization of the social 
security benefit, see Becker, U. and Pennings, F., International Standard-Setting and 
Innovations in Social Security, Wolters Kluwer, 2013), p. 381. 
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employee has to contact the employer when he or she is ill.301  
However, these rules must fit within the framework of the 
statutory obligations, and can be challenged in court, as it is 
part of labor law. 
Employers can buy private insurance to cover their risk, but 
they are not obligated to do so.  In an effort to make adoption of 
the act easier, and to get access to this large market, the 
association of insurance companies decided that the companies 
would make no assessment of employees’ health conditions when 
an employer took out insurance (this insurance covered all 
employees, so an employer could not choose who to insure).302  
Previously, when employers only had to pay benefits for six 
weeks, they often shouldered the responsibility themselves, but 
when the fifty-two-week period was introduced, they more 
frequently bought insurance.303  However, even in the insurance 
coverage context, there is still often a risk period borne by the 
employer, (e.g., for the first six weeks, or when the absence for 
leave is for longer than a certain period (“stop loss 
insurance”)).304 
To this day, the Sickness Benefit Act has not been abolished 
and still applies to those who do not currently, or no longer, have 
an employer.  Flexible workers are an example of those who do 
not currently have an employer, while those who no longer have 
an employer are the unemployed.305  For them, the act serves as 
a safety net.  Since the new rules can have the potentially 
adverse effect of employers being unwilling to employ high-risk 
persons, the Act on Medical Examinations was introduced in 
 
 301.  See Art. 7:629 BW (Civil Code). 
 302.  Sociaal Economische Raad, Advies kabinetsvoornemens ZW, AWW en WAO, 
267 (April 1995, SER 95/05), 
http://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/1990_1999/1995/b13146.ashx). 
 303.  See Theo Veerman and Jan Besseling, Prikkels en privatisering, (Elsevier, 
2001), p. 27. (describing the system of incentives created by privatization). 
 304.  Similarly, stop-loss insurance is commonly utilized in the United States to 
allow smaller employers to self-fund their health insurance plans and thereby, 
through ERISA preemption, avoid state insurance regulation. See MEDILL, supra 
note 154, at 330 (“Stop-loss insurance policies provide that the stop-loss insurer will 
pay for claims made by participants in the selfinsured plan that exceed a specified 
dollar amount. This dollar amount is known as the policy’s attachment point.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 305.  Unemployed persons are also covered for sickness, even though that may 
not lead to a different income, since they may be disqualified for unemployment 
benefit during sickness. In addition, for persons suffering from long-term sickness 
and unable to return to work, these persons may qualify for disability benefits. These 
benefits are financed by contributions paid to the sickness and disability funds. 
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1997.  The Act prohibits medical examinations as a standard 
practice, only allowing them if the job had specific health 
requirements (e.g. pilots).306  The purpose of this Act is to reduce 
the risk that chronically ill persons would never be able to find 
employment. 
In addition to this change in benefit rules, the Law on 
Conditions at the Workplace was amended in order to introduce 
more stringent obligations on the part of employers to improve 
working conditions.307  Better working conditions were meant to 
reduce the number of accidents.  In addition, the employer had 
to develop a policy with the aim of reducing sickness in the 
workplace.308  To this end, employers are obligated to make an 
analysis of all situations that could potentially endanger the 
health and safety of their employees.309 
The mere employer obligation to continue to pay the wages 
of his or her ill employees did not, in the view of the government, 
result in sufficient reintegration efforts by employers.310  One 
reason was that private insurance offset the financial burdens of 
the employer’s obligation to pay wages.  Another reason was that 
employers sometimes considered undertaking reintegration 
measures more expensive or burdensome than having to 
continue to pay an ill employee’s wages.  This led to the Wet 
Verbetering Poortwachter (Gatekeepers Act).311 
The Gatekeepers Act’s purpose was to narrow access to the 
Disability Benefits Act.312  This act requires employers and ill 
employees to undertake reintegration efforts if illness is 
expected to last for a long period (of course, in most cases of 
illness, such as colds, no measures are necessary).313  Thus, if an 
 
 306.  See de E.L. Vos, et. al., Evaluatie wet op de medische keuringen Zon, (Den 
Haag, 2001); see c.f., Netherlands Committee of Jurists for Human Rights, Medical 
Data of Dutch Patients Exchanged Without Consent, EUROPEAN LIBERTIES 
PLATFORM, http://www.liberties.eu/en/news/exchange-of-medical-data-netherlands 
(pointing out protective measures concerning medical privacy in the Netherlands 
that equate to HIPAA laws in the United States) (Nov. 10, 2014). 
 307.  Art. 7:685 BW (Civil Code). 
 308.  Arbeidsomstandighedenwet, Stb. 1999, 184 (Health and Safety Act). 
 309.  Art. 5 Arbeidsomstandighedenwet Stb. 1999, 184. 
 310.  Parliamentary Papers II 2000-2001, 27.678, nr. 3, (Explanatory 
Memorandum to Wet Verbetering poortwachter,). 
 311.  Wet verbetering poortwachter, Stb. 2001, 628. 
 312.  See Besluit SUWI, Stb. 2001, 688; see also FAQs Gatekeeper, DELFT 
UNIVERSITY OF TECH., https://intranet.tudelft.nl/en/health-and-well-being/illness-
and-recovery/disability/gatekeeper-improvement-act/faqs/ (last accessed Apr. 30, 
2015.   
 313.  Art. 7:658a BW 
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employee is expected to be ill for more than six weeks, the 
employee and the employer are required to make a reintegration 
plan.314  The plan can entail, for instance, that the employee’s 
work area be adjusted to meet his or her impairments, and/or 
training the employee to get him or her experience in another job 
within the organization.  Subsequently, the employer and 
employee have to meet on a regular basis to see how the 
reintegration efforts are progressing, and make adjustments to 
the plan if necessary.315  Each party can also require the other to 
cooperate; and if necessary, cooperation can also be enforced 
through legal means.316 
Three months before an employee applies for a disability 
benefit, the UWV (benefit administration) assesses whether the 
reintegration activities have been sufficient.317  For this purpose, 
the employee has to produce a report on the reintegration 
activities undertaken.318  If the employer’s actions are considered 
insufficient by UWV, it extends the employer’s obligation to pay 
wages for a maximum of twelve months. 319  So, in total, the 
employer may have to pay wages for three years.  Conversely, if 
the employee has not cooperated satisfactorily, she or he can be 
refused a disability benefit for a certain period, which is 
regulated in the present Disability Benefits Act.320 
In assessing the effectiveness of this scheme, only a few 
problems have been reported related to sick pay by employers. In 
addition, strict labor and dismissal laws minimize the ability of 
employers to escape the obligation to pay.  This is the 
previously-mentioned Act concerning medical assessment that 
was meant to reduce risk selection.  Another example is the 
dismissal law, which includes, a rule that a person who is ill can, 
in principle, not be given notice (dismissed) during the first two 
years of sickness.321  Still, employers can try to reduce their risks 
 
 314.  See Regeling procesgang eerste en tweede ziektejaar, Stcrt. 2002, no. 60.  
 315.  Id. 
 316.  See Art. 658a BW (A similar mechanism exists under the reasonable 
accommodation provisions of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA)); See 
generally EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue 
Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (Oct. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/accommodation.html#N_20. 
 317.  Art. 6 AOW. 
 318.  Id. 
 319.  See Art. 7:629(11) BW (Civil Code). 
 320.  Art. 30 Wet werk en inkomen naar arbeidsvermogen, Stb. 2005, 572 (The 
New Disability Act). 
 321.  See Art. 7:670 BW (Civil Code). 
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by carefully selecting employees and dismissing persons who are 
often ill, as long as the dismissal is given during a period when 
the person is not ill.  To what extent this happens is difficult to 
say, as it is hard to prove that in a particular situation the 
treatment was grounded on disability.  However, such behavior 
would amount to discrimination, which is forbidden by 
provisions limiting that type of discrimination.322 
Employers facing the risk of having to continue to pay 
wages to sick employees often offer contracts for a definite 
period, since the obligation to pay sick pay ends as soon as the 
contract expires; after all, it is a continuation of payment of 
wages, so for this purpose the existence of a labor contract is 
essential.  Alternatively, employers make use of agencies for 
temporary work; in such cases, the worker is not employed by 
them and thus they do not have to pay sick pay benefits and the 
agency can end the employment relationship on the first day of 
sickness.323 
As a result of the Gatekeepers Act, larger firms especially 
developed comprehensive policies for sick employees that 
enabled the firm to utilize them in other areas of the 
enterprise.324  Still, many of these employers are obligated by 
the benefits administration to pay an extended period of sick pay 
after the first two years, since they were considered to have 
undertaken insufficient activities to reintegrate a sick 
employee.325 
Generally, this new system strongly encourages sick 
employees and their employers to undertake reintegration 
efforts, and the sanctions in failing to do so are quite severe in 
cases of negligence; as we have seen the sanction is that the 
employer has to continue to pay wage for another period of 
(maximum) twelve months. Since the success of reintegration is 
highest when an employee is still employed by his or her 
employer (which is the case during the first two years of 
 
 322.  Wet gelijke behandeling op grond van handicap of chronische ziekte, Stb. 
2003, 206 (Act on equal treatment on ground of disability or chronical disease). 
 323.  A new law since 2014 requires employers, whose former employees become 
ill or disabled, to pay a contribution based on the costs of the benefits for these 
employees. This was introduced to make it less attractive to make use of flexible 
workers.  See Parliamentary Papers II 2011-2012, no. 33.241, 3 (referencing Wet 
beperking ziekteverzuim en arbeidsongeschiktheid vangnetters (Act to restrict sick 
leave and disability of persons in the Sickness Benefits Act)). 
 324.  See Femke Reijenga, et al., Evaluatie wet verbetering poortwachter, (Astri, 
2006). 
 325.  See id.  
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sickness, when labor law prohibits, in principal, dismissal of the 
ill employee), this form of “activation” has become a cornerstone 
of present day Dutch social security policy.326 
In Part II of this article, we discussed, as part of sickness 
benefits, family benefits: benefits that allow one to care for a sick 
family member.327  Such benefits are not part of the Dutch Sick 
Pay or Sickness Benefit Act; instead the employer has to 
continue to pay wages, as in case of short-term leave, for this 
purpose, or the employer has to grant unpaid leave.328  For 
pregnancy and maternity leave, there is a special benefit (at the 
rate of 100% of the previous wage, during sixteen weeks).329 
E. HEALTHCARE BENEFITS SCHEME 
Until 2006, the healthcare system was a dual system where 
the compulsory Law on Health Care covered employees if they 
earned a wage below a certain level, while others could buy 
voluntary insurance.330  This dual system was criticized because 
of the differences between the two parts, often resulting in more 
generous conditions for private insurance, and a lack of 
compulsory insurance for everybody.331  The Care Insurance Act 
replaced the old system in 2005,332 which now requires all 
Netherlands residents to take out private healthcare 
insurance.333 
The main reason for implementing the new act was that 
new mechanisms were deemed necessary to reassert control over 
healthcare expenses.334  The costs for medical care had been 
rising for several years due to the aging population and rapid 
medical-technological developments.335  These trends resulted in 
new and expensive tools, machines, and treatment methods, and 
 
 326.  See Becker, supra note 300, at 443-56 (noting that committees supervising 
international instruments—like ILO convention 121 and the European Social 
Charter—have been very critical of this paradigm shift from general solidarity to the 
individual responsibility of the employer). 
 327.  In Western European systems the term “family benefits” refers to benefits 
paid for the maintenance of children. 
 328.  See Wet Arbeid en Zorg, Stb. 2001, 567. 
 329.  Id. 
 330.  Ziekenfondswet, Stb. 1964, 392 (Healthcare Act). 
 331.  Hofman, supra note 292. 
 332.  Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act). 
 333.  Id. 
 334.  See Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29763.3, 2. 
 335.  Id. 
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the costs were expected to grow even further.336 
Economic approaches have become very influential in Dutch 
healthcare.  The main idea behind the new act was to have a 
system of controlled competition between insurance companies, 
signaling a massive shift from the old healthcare act, which was 
much more centrally regulated by the state.337 
The objective of the new act is to ensure that insurance 
companies, care providers, and the insured are encouraged to 
organize and make use of healthcare more efficiently.338  For this 
purpose, the act mandates that each resident choose a care 
insurance company from which to buy insurance.339  This leads 
to competition between insurance companies, with the hope that 
insurance companies will focus more on the preferences of the 
insured.  At the same time, people will hopefully make more 
efficient arrangements when buying insurance from providers, 
since otherwise the contributions for which they have to pay will 
be too high (or the losses will become too great).340  In addition to 
competition, the act also contains important solidarity elements: 
since all residents are compulsorily insured, insurance 
companies have to provide all applicants with insurance under 
the same conditions, regardless of their personal characteristics 
and situations.341  The act also guarantees that an insurance 
company can only ask for the same contribution from its insured 
for basic insurance coverage (i.e. the insurance regulated by the 
act), so it cannot differentiate between risks.342  The act defines 
the elements of basic insurance, such as what care is available 
and under what conditions.343  Examples include medical care by 
general practitioners, medical specialists and midwives; hospital 
stays; medicines; specialist mental healthcare, including 
treatment by a psychiatrist; basic mental healthcare, including 
primary care psychologists and an internet treatment process; 
tools for treatment, care, rehabilitation, nursing, or a specific 
limitation; physiotherapy for persons up to eighteen years old; 
limited physical therapy and exercise therapy after the 21st 
treatment for certain chronic diseases; pelvic physiotherapy for 
 
 336. .Id. 
 337.  Id. 
 338.  Id. 
 339.  Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act). 
 340.  See Parliamentary Papers II, 2003/2004, 29763. 
 341.  Zorgverzekeringswet Stb. 2005, 358. (Care Insurance Act). 
 342.  Zorgverzekeringswet Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act). 
 343.  Zorgverzekeringswet Stb. 2005, 358 (Care Insurance Act). 
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urinary incontinence up to the ninth treatment; speech therapy 
and occupational therapy; dental care (control and treatment) 
for children up to eighteen years old; dental surgical care and 
dentures; patient transport; maternity care; up to three hours of 
treatment for dietary advice; fee of three IVF treatments; 
dyslexia care; and a stop-smoking program. 344 
Insurance companies have choices in how they implement 
the health insurance act for the insured.  For instance, they can 
decide whether the costs get reimbursed or care providers get 
paid directly by the company, as well as whether they reduce 
contributions if the insured bears the risk of the costs (in 
addition to the statutory defined own risk).345  In this way, they 
can compete with other companies, and are also allowed to profit 
from their insurance schemes.346 
Strictly speaking though, under the act there are no longer 
“insured persons;” instead people have the obligation to buy 
insurance.347  If a person does not buy such insurance, that 
person is simply not insured.  In addition, in the case of non-
insurance or no coverage, a fine can be imposed.348 
Persons under eighteen years of age do not have to pay 
contributions, and persons on a low income can receive a 
compensation, paid by the Tax Office, for paying the 
contribution.349  Insurance coverage starts on the day on which 
the company receives an insurance application, and the 
insurance can even have retroactive effect up to four months 
after the obligation to be insured arises.350  The purpose of this 
provision is to ensure the comprehensiveness of the system, so 
there is continuous coverage for those who are slow in making a 
choice or for those who change companies at the end of the 
calendar year.351  This is atypical for insurance because, in 
general, “burning houses are no longer insured.”352 
 
 344.  See Rijksoverheid, Health Insurance, 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/zorgverzekering/vraag-en-antwoord/wat-
zit-er-in-het-basispakket-van-de-zorgverzekering.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2014). 
 345.  Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29.763. 
 346.  Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29.763. 
 347.  Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2014, 494 (Care Insurance Act).  
 348.  The fine is $410. After a second fine of the same amount, the insurance is 
bought by the public insurances and the contribution is deducted from the income of 
the person concerned (most often a benefit). 
 349.  Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2011, 111 (Care Insurance Act). 
 350.  Art. 5 Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2006, 629 (Care Insurance Act). 
 351.  Parliamentary Papers II 2003-2004, no. 29.763. 
 352.  Id. 
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An insured person is allowed to give notice of termination 
for the insurance contract to the insurance company each 
year.353  The idea is that it gives people the freedom to make 
their own insurance decisions each year, giving them the 
flexibility to choose.  In the case of a carrier change, the new 
company must accept all applications, regardless of the “risk 
profile” of the applicant.354 
In addition to the statutory insurance offerings, healthcare 
companies can offer supplementary insurance to cover services 
not included in the basic plans. These supplementary plans are 
not compulsory for the patients, but they are attractive for the 
companies because they are often much more profitable than the 
statutory insurance.  Furthermore, insurance companies can 
refuse applicants for supplementary insurance since these are 
private insurance schemes, which are not governed by the 
Zorgverzekeringswet, but fall under insurance law.  They can 
also slightly force the hand of insurance applicants because 
many insurance companies require that a person purchase the 
basic insurance from the company before being allowed to select 
the supplementary insurance.355 
The contribution of insurance contracts vary per insurance 
company (and companies may offer a choice of contracts), but the 
contribution is the same for all those who have bought the same 
insurance.356  This means that no differences are allowed, e.g., 
for risk level or for age.  It follows from this, however, that 
contribution rates may vary from company to company. 
The contribution is a flat-rate one, so it does not depend on 
income.357  Claimants have to bear part of the healthcare costs 
per year themselves (435 dollars a year).358 If one opts to bear an 
additional share of the costs (up to 622 dollars a year), 
contributions are lower. 
Some insurance companies provide for a so-called collective 
contract for groups such as members of a football club, trade 
union, an association of patients, or employees of a particular 
 
 353.  Art. 7 Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2008, 271 (Care Insurance Act). 
 354.  Parliamentary Papers II 2003/2004, 29.763. 
 355.  Margreet Reitsma-van Rooijen, Aanvullende zorgverzekering 
zonderbasisverzekering niet altijd mogelijk, NIVEL (Dec. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.nivel.nl/nieuws/aanvullende-zorgverzekering-zonder-basisverzekering-
niet-altijd-mogelijk-3.   
 356.  Art. 17  Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
 357.  Art. 16 Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
 358.  Art. 19 Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
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enterprise; there is no limit to the type of group with which an 
insurance company can make an agreement.359  On the basis of 
the contract, reductions to the contribution can be offered to the 
members of the collective contract, up to a 10% maximum.360 
In addition, employers pay a wage-related contribution to a 
risk equalization fund.361  This fund compensates an insurance 
company if it insures persons of higher-than-average risk.362  
This was put into place to minimize the possibility that 
particular insurance companies would try to discourage persons 
of high risk, such as the chronically ill, from buying insurance. 
363  However, it appears as though this does not sufficiently 
encourage insurance companies to buy care efficiently, since 
they are compensated anyway.364  For this reason, in the future, 
the equalization will take place ex ante only; meaning on the 
basis of specified characteristics of the clients.365 
Healthcare coverage is defined by statutory rules,366 but, as 
we have seen, private organizations (insurance companies) 
administer the health benefits. Thus, this system maintains a 
tight balance between solidarity and room for making a profit.  
The main goal of this structure was to introduce efficiencies into 
the system (with market instruments) and still realize a 
sufficient and affordable system for all residents. 
IV. COMPARISON OF THE DUTCH AND AMERICAN 
SOCIAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS 
At first blush, the American and Dutch social protection 
systems seem quite different, but the picture changes if we do 
not limit ourselves to statutory benefits and also take into 
account benefits provided by employers (whether or not such 
arrangements involve collective bargaining agreements). 
In order to address the issue posed in the first section, we 
will compare the systems in terms of the levels of protection that 
are ensured.  In Part A, we will describe, for each of the risks 
 
 359.  Art. 18 Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
 360.  Art. 18 Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
 361.  Art. 42 Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
 362.  Art. 39 Zvw (Care Insurance Act). 
 363.  Parliamentary Papers II 2003/2004, 29.763. 
 364.  See Hofman and Pennings, supra n. 292 (describing the system in more 
detail). 
 365.  Id. 
 366.  See, e.g., Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2006, 660 (Care Insurance Act). 
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selected in this contribution, the levels of protection that are 
ensured. We will then compare the distribution of 
responsibilities over the public and non-public actors. We will 
also mention the effects in the countries of the approach chosen.  
In Part B, we will then describe the policy options following from 
this analysis. 
A. THE LEVELS OF PROTECTIONS ENSURED AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSIBILITIES 
1. Old Age and Survivors 
As an initial point with regard to old age and survivor 
benefits, the greying of the population is a common phenomenon, 
including the rising of pension age, in both the United States 
and the Netherlands.367  Additional comparisons are divided 
between pensions defined by laws and occupational pensions. 
a. Pensions Whose Contents are Defined by National 
Law 
Both in the United States and the Netherlands, old-age and 
survivor benefits are governed by statutory rules, and the 
systems are also similar to the extent that the statutory 
protection provides for only a relatively low income replacement 
ratio.  In the United States, Social Security only replaces about 
40% to 50% of the previous wage;368 in the Netherlands, the 
benefit is flat-rate ($1367 for a single person, $1888 for a couple 
per month).369  This means that pensioners who previously 
earned a low income (e.g., the minimum wage) receive a 
relatively high replacement rate, while higher income 
individuals receive a lower income replacement rate.  Based on 
2012 figures, this means that for those Dutch workers earning 
the average income of about  $61,200, the replacement ratio is 
about 27% of the average earnings of an individual, much less 
 
 367.  See e.g., Leen Pressman, Dutch retirement age increase to reduce pensioners 
by half million, INVESTMENT & PENSIONS EUROPE (July 18, 2012), 
http://www.ipe.com/dutch-retirement-age-increase-to-reduce-pensioners-by-half-
million/46614.fullarticle (“The Dutch government's recent decision to raise the 
official retirement age from 65 to 67 in 2023 will reduce the number of pensioners by 
half a million by 2025, according to Statistics Netherlands (CBS)”). 
 368.  See Aon Consulting, supra note 54.  
 369.  See infra Section III. 
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than even the American replacement rate.370 
b. Occupational (Employer-Sponsored or Union-
Sponsored) Retirement Plans 
Because pension benefits regulated by laws are generally 
low in both the United States and the Netherlands, there are 
also employer-based (in the Netherlands) and employer—and 
union-based—supplementary schemes (in the United States).  In 
the United States, these types of benefits are voluntary;371 in the 
Netherlands, pension plans are also voluntary, but plans made 
between employers and unions in a sector can be declared legally 
binding by the minister on their request.372 
Although both countries promote occupational pensions by 
means of tax subsidies or deductions from tax, the Dutch 
government has, over time, had a more active policy to 
encourage employers to offer these types of pensions, and the 
fact that industry-wide pension agreements are legally binding 
is an important element to extending the coverage of pension 
schemes.  However, since the costs of the pension tax subsidies 
have been increasing, the Dutch tax rules have been amended, 
and thus the Dutch legislature has indirectly had a very large 
impact on the contents of these schemes.373  For instance, the 
government determines such matters as the starting age for 
receiving a pension, the benefit paid by the pension, and the 
conditions under which pensions may be maintained.374  Only if 
the schemes meet these legal standards are pension 
contributions considered tax deductible.375  Still, at the end of 
the day, it is the responsibility of the fund to have sufficient 
reserves for being able to meet the promised pensions, and in 
case of a deficit, the government does not provide 
 
 370.  OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2013: OECD and G20 Indicators: OECD 
PUBLISHING, http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/finance-and-
investment/pensions-at-a-glance-2013/key-indicators-netherlands_pension_glance-
2013-table162-en#page1 (last updated Oct. 16, 2013). 
 371.  See Scott Mayland, Note, Ratcheting Up the Duty: The Department of 
Labor’s Misguided Attempt to Impose a Paternalistic Model Upon Defined 
Contribution Plans Through ERISA, 75  OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 649 (2014) (explaining 
how ERISA does not require employers to establish pension plans for their 
employees, but does regulate plans that are established).   
 372.  See infra III(2)(a). 
 373.  Id. 
 374.  Id. 
 375.  Id. 
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compensation.376 
In both countries, tax deductibility of occupational pensions 
plays a large role.  Although this type of tax incentive may be 
seen as an alternative to making a scheme compulsory, the 
problem remains that persons who are not offered such 
occupational pensions still have to, in a sense, contribute to 
those covered by occupational pensions, since they have to pay 
more taxes to help make up for the lost tax revenue. 
Traditionally, in the Netherlands, occupational pensions 
were expected to realize a pension (including the AOW pension) 
of 70% of the last earned wages after forty years, although this 
was not often reached.377  This changed to 70% of the average 
lifetime income, and since the economic crisis of 2008, funds 
have made clear that they cannot make promises for a specific 
pension anymore.378  In 2008, 49% of the households had an 
income replacement rate below 70% of the total average 
income.379 
One important difference between the Dutch and the 
American systems is the growing American reliance on 
participant-directed 401(k) defined contribution plans, with or 
without employer contributions.380  It does not appear that such 
salary deferral plans have had the same impact in the 
Netherlands.381  Another difference is that Netherlands pension 
laws mandate that workers’ 401(k)-type plans be changed into 
lifetime annuities to “ensure they do not spend down all their 
 
 376.  Id. 
 377.  Id. 
 378.  See Art. 9 AOW. 
 379.  Marike Knoef et al., Measuring Retirement Savings Adequacy; developing a 
multi-pillar approach in the Netherlands, J. OF PENSIONS AND ECON. FIN., available 
at http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/mk-2014-04.pdf  (last visited on May 4, 2015). 
 380.  See PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN: ABSTRACT OF 2012 FORM 5500 
ANNUAL REPORTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR EMPLOYEE BENEFITS SECURITY 
ADMINISTRATION, p. 1 (Oct. 2014), available at 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/2012pensionplanbulletin.pdf (highlighting that when 
401(k)-type plans were brought into existence in 1978, participants contributed just 
29% of the total for all defined contribution plans, but that number rose to about 60% 
in 1999, where it remains now). Recent data reiterates that trend—401(k) 
participation increased from 513,000 to 516,000 in 2012. Id. 
 381.  See Fieke van der Lecq & Adri van de Wurff, The Price of Pension Risk, 13.3 
Journal of Risk 83, 92 (2011), 
http://people.few.eur.nl/vanderlecq/Publications/The%20price%20of%20pension%20ri
sks.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (“The simulations show that DC schemes have 
disadvantages for participants, because participants bear a high investment risk in 
such schemes”). 
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savings before they turn 75 or 80.”382  That is in stark contrast to 
the growing trend of Americans who withdraw large sums from 
their 401(k)’s before retirement, though there has been recent 
efforts by the U.S. Department of Labor to increase lifetime 
income options in the 401(k) context.383  One more important 
distinction is that in the Netherlands, if a pension fund cannot 
finance its long-term pension obligations, in a move to keep the 
fund from crumbling, the central bank (De Nederlandsche Bank) 
can mandate that the fund pay reduced benefits for both current 
and future retirees.384  On the other hand, United States law 
does not permit companies to reduce accrued benefits under 
ERISA’s anti-cutback rule.385  If a defined benefit plan 
(traditional pension) becomes sufficiently underfunded, the 
employer or PBGC can terminate the plan and the participants 
will be insured under a federal pension insurance scheme.386  In 
such instances, pensioners will receive less than the initially 
promised benefit.387 
There are also real differences in the particular role played 
by occupational pensions in the Dutch and American schemes.  
Although both countries place heavy reliance on occupational 
pensions as part of overall retirement security, in the 
Netherlands, the major part has been made compulsory by the 
government based on the request by employers’ organizations 
and trade unions that adopted such pension plans.388  Thus, 
sector-wide or company pension plans exist in the Netherlands, 
whereas “multiemployer plans” or “multiple employer plans” are 
less utilized, though not completely absent, from the American 
landscape.389  A disadvantage of the compulsory system is that 
 
 382.  See Steven Greenhouse, How They Do It Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/15/business/retirementspecial/international-
retirement-plans-offer-insight-to-aid-americassystem.html. 
 383.  See id. 
 384.  See generally DENEDERLANDSCHEBANK, DNB rondt beoordeling evaluatie 
herstelplannen, DNB, http://www.dnb.nl/nieuws/nieuwsoverzicht-en-
archief/persberichten-2014/dnb307075.jsp (last visited May 4, 2015). 
 385.  See 29 U.S.C. §1054(g) (2012). 
 386.  Daniel Keating, Chapter 11’s New Ten-Ton Monster: the PBGC and 
Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803, 806–07 (1993). 
 387.  See id. at 807. 
 388.  See The Netherlands, PENSION FUNDS ONLINE, 
http://www.pensionfundsonline.co.uk/content/country-profiles/the-netherlands/96 
(last visited May 4, 2015) (citing that many industry pension schemes direct people 
toward “compulsory membership,” which the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment can approve upon request). 
 389.  Harriet Weinstein & William J. Wiatrowski, Multiemployer Pension Plans, 
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individuals have no choice whether to participate in occupational 
pension plans, and might be better off in investing their 
retirement funds in individual retirement accounts outside of 
their employer.390  On the other hand, an advantage is that from 
this system of high compulsory coverage it follows that the 
number of employees without an occupational pension is very 
low. 
Finally, the predicament of non-employees is unique, but 
the two countries do not seem to differ much from the 
perspective on how such social protection schemes protect the 
unemployed when it comes to retirement income, health 
coverage, and the like. 
B. DISABILITY BENEFITS 
1. Disability Schemes Defined in Legislation 
With disability benefits, the differences between the United 
States and the Netherlands are more significant than in old-age 
schemes.  In the United States, disability benefits are provided 
at a minimum level by the federal government through Social 
Security, although disability is also provided under a few state 
insurance programs and through employer-sponsored plans.391  
The general level varies widely by state depending on work 
history and nature of disability.  In the Netherlands, the benefits 
are more generous (up to 75% of $5214/month), but only in case 
of the fully and permanently disabled.392  Probably because of 
 
COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS 19, 21, 23 (Spring 1999) 
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/multiemployer-pension-plans.pdf; See Lauren 
Foster, Should Retirement Savings Be Mandatory? (Forum), ENTERPRISING INVESTOR 
(Oct. 8, 2013), http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/10/08/should-retirement-
savings-be-mandatory-forum-2/ (questioning if it would make sense for the United 
States to try out more mandatory retirements savings programs). 
 390.  See Scott Holsopple, How to Take Control of Your 401(k), U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (Aug. 27, 2013), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/the-smarter-
mutual-fund-investor/2013/08/27/how-to-take-control-of-your-401k (last visited May 
4, 2015) (talking about the flexibility that a 401(k) offers and how people are able to 
take charge of their plans and make their own investment decisions). 
 391.  See Hinden, supra note 66 (describing the federal government’s involvement 
in disability payments via Social Security); See also Ebeling, supra note 74 (noting 
employer involvement in disability plans); See also State Short-term Disability 
Benefits, NOLO.COM, (Mar. 22, 2015, 2:35 PM), http://www.nolo.com/legal-
encyclopedia/state-short-term-disability-benefits.   
 392.  See Swiss Life Network, Netherlands: Employee Benefits Reference Manual, 
SWISSLIFE, 
https://www.swisslife.com/content/dam/id_corporateclients/downloads/ebrm/Netherla
PENNINGS (DO NOT DELETE) 10/1/15  10:30 AM 
2015]ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL PROTECTION BENEFITS 375 
the relatively high benefits, the Dutch scheme needs many more 
policy measures to regulate the influx and outflow of 
beneficiaries than the equivalent U.S. scheme.  However, the 
Social Security disability scheme in the United States (SSDI) is 
highly regulated, partially because the system is in financial 
distress and there is a need to cut back on awarding benefits as 
generously as they were in the past.  So we think the Dutch and 
American systems are more similar in this regard than it might 
first appear to most people. 
In the United States, the disability benefit system involves 
the cooperation of federal and state schemes, supplemented by 
employers’ schemes.  As discussed above, these combined 
benefits are still quite low.  That also explains the difference 
between the U.S. and the Netherlands with regard to the 
conditions under which such benefits are awarded.  The Dutch 
requirements are very strict, supplying disability benefits only 
for that part of the income loss that is due to medical reasons.393  
So if a person is (in theory) able to do other work, she or he is not 
awarded disability benefits to the extent of the income that can 
be received from that other work, thus providing not much 
protection to those with reduced health who are  still able to do 
some work.  Although there are also positive aspects to  this 
approach—e.g., being part of the labor market supports the 
integration of  persons  into society—the problem remains that it 
is often difficult to find work if you are disabled, both because of 
employer prejudices and not having the necessary ability to 
perform certain forms of work. 
Compared to the Dutch disability eligibility rules, the 
United States’ rules are much more loosely defined.  For 
instance, the impairments must be severe enough (i.e., last for at 
least one year), to keep the person from carrying on in the 
regular job or any other type of work.394  There is also a 
considerable amount of time that it takes before eligible 
individuals are able to receive their disability Social Security 
benefits through the system.395 
 
nds.pdf (last visited May 4, 2015) (providing that permanently/fully disabled people 
get 75% of their last full daily wage that is “maximized to a salary ceiling”). 
 393.  See infra III(b). 
 394.  Hinden, supra note 66 (explaining how SSDI is a benefit that people can 
become eligible for if they have impairments that are severe enough to keep them 
from engaging in normal occupations at their place of work or any place of work). 
 395.  See id. (explaining how it might be a longer process for one to begin to 
receive benefits if they do not have one of the serious medical conditions named on 
Social Security’s Compassionate Allowance List). 
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2. Employer-Sponsored Benefits 
Because federal and state government disability benefits 
are generally low, a number of employers have sought to provide 
additional disability benefits through short-term and long-term 
disability policies.396  One of the biggest issues is that many 
employers—especially smaller employers—do not provide such 
coverage.397  Even if an employee is covered by such an 
employer-sponsored policy, eligibility can be sometimes difficult 
to establish.  This is because of two main reasons.  First, many 
disabled workers pursue their social security disability claim 
first, and then only pursue their long-term disability claim 
under their employer policy once their eligibility for federal 
benefits has been determined.  Although the determination of 
disability for Social Security purposes will certainly help long-
term disability claims, if too much time passes before long-term 
disability benefits are sought, the employee may have forfeited 
the right to receive under the applicable statute of limitations in 
the plan document.  Second, plan administrators strictly 
construe eligibility requirements, and it is not unusual for such 
claims to be denied for finding lack of disability based on the 
submitted medical evidence. 
Because of the level of disability benefits in the 
Netherlands, there is no general need to supplement the benefit 
defined in the WIA, although it sometimes happens.  In some 
situations, collective agreements apply a more generous 
definition of disability so that the worker receives a higher 
benefit.  Generally, however, it can be said that employers 
support the general approach of getting persons back to, or into, 
work, and the purpose of the government disability benefit rules 
are not undermined.  Instead, the collective agreements support 
the “activating” element by, for example, providing that in some 
sectors, collective agreement employees who are disabled receive 
additional protections (e.g., more than 35% cannot be dismissed).  
Disabled workers’ employers must find suitable work for them.  
This being said, there is still a substantial challenge to meet in 
helping disabled workers find jobs in the first place. 
 
 396.  2013 Employee Benefits, supra note 65, at 12 (demonstrating the percentage 
of employers surveyed in 2013 who offer either long-term or short-term disability 
insurance to their employees). 
 397.  Michelle Andrews, Employers Increasingly Trimming or Cutting Disability 
Benefits, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 20, 2011), 
http://kaiserhealthnews.org/news/michelle-andrews-on-disability-coverage/. 
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C. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS 
There are also significant differences in the unemployment 
insurance programs in the two countries.  While both countries 
have primarily a public/government-run system, the American 
system is decentralized throughout individual states, whereas 
the Dutch system is a uniform national one.  Additionally, 
whereas the Dutch system uses more private actors, the 
American system only uses private actors marginally in running 
their system. 
For the U.S., every state has a separate unemployment 
insurance program, but federal law establishes the rules not 
only on benefit funding based on an employer tax (only three 
states have employee contributions play a role), but also 
provides the general set of standards state unemployment 
compensation systems must follow to merit favorable tax 
treatment under federal tax law.398  The typical length that 
someone can receive benefits is around twenty-six weeks, with 
extensions provided during times of extremely heavy 
unemployment.399  Furthermore, people only receive, on average, 
between 25% and 40% of their previously earned wage.400  
Employees can be disqualified from eligibility if they do not look 
for new work, voluntarily quit, or are discharged for “willful” 
misconduct.401 
By comparison, in the Netherlands, the UWV handles the 
unemployment scheme (on a national basis). The Unemployment 
Benefits Act provides the applicable rules.  Consequently, there 
are no variations in the legal position of beneficiaries in relation 
to the region where they live or the sector in which they work.  
The level of benefit is also the same for everyone, i.e., 75% in the 
first two months and then 70%.  Additionally, a minimum 
income is guaranteed by a subsistence benefit. 
Neither employers nor trade unions play a role in the 
 
 398.  See State Unemployment Insurance Benefits, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR EMP. & 
TRAINING ADMIN., http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/uifactsheet.asp (last 
updated May 23, 2013). 
 399.  Id. 
 400.  See Douglas McIntyre, The 10 Best States for Unemployment Benefits – and 
the 10 Worst, DAILY FINANCE, 
http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/05/12/unemployment-benefits-best-worst-states/ 
(last updated May 13, 2011), (providing slightly dated figures, but nonetheless 
indicative of the typical unemployment benefits across the country). 
 401.  See Maranville, supra note 98, at 304; see also Schuckers & Bradley, supra 
note 99, at 42. 
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administration of the U.S. or Dutch unemployment 
compensation systems, and in both countries, the law has to be 
changed before such a role is possible (if desirable).  For both 
countries, involving trade unions in the administration of the 
scheme in order to make membership more attractive does not 
fit into the political and cultural traditions.  In the Netherlands, 
it is currently being investigated whether the joint participation 
of employers and employees in the administration of benefits 
would be useful in helping unemployed workers or those 
threatened by unemployment, or workers who are not capable to 
perform the job anymore, to get another job, preferably through 
a direct job to job transfer. 
In the United States, the major problem of the 
unemployment benefits system is the low level of income 
replacement.  The increased involvement of employers or unions 
would probably not provide a better solution, unless the system 
is modified to require considerably more contributions from 
these actors.  On the other hand, important progress has been 
made with regard to the American unemployment compensation 
system in states that have utilized a more active approach to 
their job search requirements.  It is also hoped that the 
increased use of technology will streamline some of the more 
time-consuming bureaucratic processes in the system and permit 
unemployed workers to access their benefits more quickly. 
D. PROTECTION IN CASE OF SICKNESS 
Because the United States lacks a federal paid sickness 
leave policy under the current version of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act (FMLA), states and municipalities across the country 
have had to fill in the gap by enacting their own paid sickness 
and leave bills and ordinances.  Needless to say, this lack of 
uniformity in treatment with regard to sickness and other 
related forms of leave has led to significant disparities in 
treatment of sick employees across the country.  Moreover, 
because the FMLA currently only provides job-protected, unpaid 
sick leave for twelve weeks per year only for employers with fifty 
or more employees,402 there is a large number of workers at 
smaller American employers who may be entitled to no sickness 
benefits at all as a matter of law, and must depend instead on 
the benevolence of their employer. 
 
 402.  See generally The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 110.  
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The other way in which American employees may be eligible 
for a “sickness” benefit is through Workers Compensation state 
laws or through the reasonable accommodation provisions of the 
American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).  Workers 
compensation laws provide ex post compensation for those who 
become sick or injured as a result of their employment.403  The 
ADA, on the other hand, provides that qualified individuals with 
a disability must receive reasonable accommodations to allow 
them to continue to work, as long as it does not cause an undue 
burden on the employer.404  Thus, the ADA and worker 
compensation laws might provide additional protections for sick 
or injured workers in the American Workplace. 
Such concerns do not impact the Dutch sickness benefits 
scheme, where all workers are entitled to compensation 
according to a uniform, national Act.  However, unlike other 
schemes in Western Europe, this compensation is not paid on 
the basis of a benefit scheme.  Instead, Dutch employers are 
required by statute to pay for 104 weeks (two years) of 70% of 
the wages for their sick employees.405  In other countries, such 
period, if any, is much shorter.406  Many Dutch employees 
actually receive a higher compensation for some time (e.g., the 
first fifty-two weeks) on the basis of their collective agreement or 
individual contract of employment.407 
To cover this sickness pay obligation, employers can 
purchase private insurance to cover this risk and insurance 
companies offer policies without any underwriting taking 
place.408  Most of these sickness insurance policies provide for a 
 
 403.  Lee Anne Neumann, Comment, Workers’ Compensation and High Stress 
Occupations: Application of Wisconsin’s Unusual Stress Test to Law Enforcement 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 147, 162 (1993). 
 404.  Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. 
L. REV. 1119, 1129–30 (2010). 
 405.  Social Security Programs throughout the World: Europe, 2010 Netherlands, 
SSA, http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/progdesc/ssptw/2010-2011/Europe/Netherlands 
(last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 406.  See, e.g., Statutory Sick Pay (SSP): Employer Guide, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/employers-sick-pay/eligibility-and-form-ssp1 (last visited Mar. 
22, 2015). 
 407.  EurWORK, Collective Bargaining Developments Marked by Stability, 
EUROFOUND, 
http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/de/observatories/eurwork/articles/industrial-
relations-working-conditions-other/collective-bargaining-developments-marked-by-
stability (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). 
 408.  Philip R. de Jong, Recent Changes in Dutch Disability Policy, APE 1, 10, 
(July 2012) http://www.ape.nl/include/downloadFile.asp?id=322.  
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type of stop-loss insurance, meaning that the employer pays for 
the first six weeks of sickness before the insurance coverage 
becomes operable.409  The obligation to pay sick pay also applies 
to those who are employed on a part-time basis;410 in addition 
the Sickness Benefits Act provides for public benefits for the 
unemployed and some other specified categories.  Finally, 
through the Dutch Gatekeepers Act, employers must work to 
reintegrate sick or injured employees back into the workforce, 
much like the ADA requires in the United States, although the 
Dutch obligations and fines in case of non-compliances are more 
uniformly specified (e.g. extension of the sick pay period by a 
maximum of twelve months).411  The combined effect of these 
provisions are seen as improving both safety and health in the 
Dutch workplace and the integration of ill and disabled persons 
in society. 
We will not go deep into the protection of women in case of 
pregnancy and maternity, but the differences in this area are 
significant.  Whereas the protection deemed necessary for 
mother and child means that women receive 100% of their full 
wage during four months in the Netherlands,412 such protection 
is lacking in the United States.  Also for self-employed women, 
there is now a public benefit (at subsistence level).413  It is seen 
as important that women take the rest to have the child and 
that employers do not feel the costs of having employees who 
become pregnant. 
E. HEALTH CARE BENEFITS 
It is interesting that for their healthcare systems, the 
United States and the Netherlands have comparable dynamics.  
This is especially so since most of the industrialized world 
 
 409.  See id. 
 410.  Zorgverzekeringswet, Stb. 2005, 358.  
 411.  Wet Verlenging loondoorbetaling bij ziekte, Stb. 1996, 142 (Sickness Act). 
 412.  Due to EU law, this protection applies generally to all EU states, though the 
EU Parliament is currently attempting to lengthen the period of maternity leave. See 
European Trade Union Committee for Education, Maternity Leave Directive Back in 
European Parliament (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.csee-etuce.org/news/archive/273-
maternity-leave-directive-back-ineuropean-parliament (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) 
(describing lengthening of EU minimum law from 14 to 20 weeks). 
 413.  Simone Cusack, Decision to Deny Certain Self-Employed Women Maternity 
Benefits Violated CEDAW (Elisabeth de Blok et al. v. the Netherlands), OPCEDAW 
(Sept. 1, 2014), http://opcedaw.wordpress.com/2014/09/01/decision-to-deny-certain-
self-employed-women-maternity-benefits-violated-cedaw-elisabeth-de-blok-et-al-v-
the-netherlands/. 
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operates with single-payer, national health systems providing 
most health care benefits.414  The Dutch Health Care Act now 
obliges individuals to buy insurance from a private company.415  
Likewise, under the ACA, Americans who do not have health 
insurance through Medicare, Medicaid, their employer, or 
through an individually-bought policy, are obliged under the 
individual mandate to have “minimum essential coverage.”416  
Such insurance policies can be bought on state exchanges, where 
individuals live in states that have set up such exchanges, or on 
the federal exchange, if the state has not developed a state 
exchange.417  Additionally, under the ACA’s employer mandate, 
employers with at least fifty full-time equivalent employees 
must provide the opportunity for 95% of their full-time 
employees to receive minimum essential coverage through an 
employer-based health insurance policy.418  If the employer does 
not provide such coverage or does not provide statutorily-
determined “affordable” coverage, the employer must pay a 
penalty per employee which helps to finance the tax subsidies 
lower-income Americans receive to purchase policies on a federal 
or state health exchange.419 
 In both countries, there are requirements as far as what 
health costs must be covered by the statutorily required scheme.  
However, there is much room for individual choice between 
companies, and within a company, there are some choices 
between policies, whereas the statutorily required benefit 
package can be extended by extra coverage only minimally.  
That being said, American health plans vary considerably on 
what benefits they offer depending on if they are insured or self-
insured, large plans or small plans, or grandfathered or non-
grandfathered.420  Although there is a risk of substantial 
 
 414.  See True Cost, List of Countries with Universal Healthcare, TRUE COST 
BLOG (Aug. 9, 2009, 9:25 PM), http://www.truecostblog.com/2009/08/09/countries-
with-universal-healthcare-by-date. 
 415.  Claire Daley & James Gubb, Healthcare Systems: The Netherlands, CIVITAS, 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/nhs/download/netherlands.pdf (last updated Jan. 2013). 
 416.  Annie L. Mach, Individual Mandate Under ACA, CONG. RES. SERV. 1 (Aug. 
12, 2014), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41331.pdf. 
 417.  See Richard Cauchi, State Actions to Address Health Insurance Exchanges, 
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGIS. (Jan. 22, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-
actions-to-implement-the-health-benefit.aspx.  
 418.  See Employer Mandate Fact Sheet, supra note 159, at 1. 
 419.  Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 4980H, 124 Stat. 235 (2013).  
 420.  See Grandfathered v. Non-Grandfathered Plans Under ObamaCare, UPMC 
(Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.yourhealthcaresimplified.org/news/grandfathered-vs-
non-grandfathered-plans-under-obamacare/ (explaining the key differences between 
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differences between the types of health insurance employees 
receive with different employers, there is still more choice than 
in government-run schemes like those found in most countries 
with national health plans.  This increased choice fits well 
within the consumer-driven benefit plans of present-day 
American society, whether 401(k) plans on the pension side or 
high-deductible health plans coupled with health saving 
accounts on the health side.421 
In the Dutch system, the focus is more on the legislature’s 
wish that insurance companies require more efficient health 
care by making arrangements with the care providers.  The 
limits of such flexibility are, however, still subject to strict 
political discussion and supervision by government and 
parliament.  In December 2014, for instance, a bill was discussed 
in parliament to allow insurance companies to offer a policy that 
obliges patients to go to specific care providers contracted by the 
care provider, thus limiting their choice for a health care 
provider.422  By such contracts, it is possible to have cheaper and 
more efficient health care.  In addition, more expensive policies 
allowing free choice remain available.  Parliament, however, did 
not agree with this restriction on choice.423 
V. GENERAL DIFFERENCES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF 
THE SYSTEMS 
A. USE OF PRIVATE ACTORS 
In the Netherlands, where private actors are statutorily 
involved in the administration of benefits (like employers with 
 
the various health plans in existence—with the main stipulation being that 
grandfathered plans do not have to comply with all of the ACA changes, such as 
cover preventive care with no cost sharing or guarantee a right to appeal denial 
decisions). 
 421.  See High Deductible Health Plan, HUMANA, 
https://www.humana.com/insurance-throughemployer/products-and-services/medical-
plans/hdhp (last visited Oct. 11, 2014) (noting how using both a high deductible 
health plan (HDHP) and health savings account (HSA) allows a person to set aside a 
pre-planned amount of tax-free money (just like for a 401(k)) to cover health costs). 
 422.  Kamerstukken 2014/15, 33.362, Wijziging van de Wet marktordening  
gezondheidszorg en enkele andere wetten, teneinde te voorkomen dat zorgverzekeraars 
zelf zorg verlenen of zorg laten aanbieden door 
zorgaanbieders waarin zij zelf zeggenschap hebben.   
 423.  Sam de Voogt, Senaat verwerpt plan beperking vrije zorgkeuze, PvdA-fractie 
wil praten, NRC.NL, (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2014/12/16/plan-
nieuwe-zorgpolis-niet-door-de-eerste-kamer. 
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sick pay and private insurance companies with healthcare), their 
responsibilities are regulated to a large extent.  In the United 
States, there is very little use of private actors in the social 
protection benefits schemes defined by legislation; in those areas 
where states and employers are presumed to organize 
protection, requirements on the contents of the protection 
(especially in the healthcare context) can vary significantly.424 
The difference between the two countries can also be seen in 
the legal protections offered to those receiving benefits, the level 
of benefits offered, and the grounds for excluding individuals 
from receiving benefits.  For instance, with health care, the 
Dutch system provides a minimum package of benefits in high 
detail.425  The Dutch Health Care Act also gives detailed rules on 
the role insurance companies play in the system.426 
In the Netherlands, there is attachment to the idea that 
giving the private actors a role in the social protection benefit 
system will encourage more efficient and effective 
administration of the benefit rules and will encourage 
individuals to go back to work.  Such reforms will also invest 
private actors, like employers, with an interest in reducing the 
expense of the social protection system.  But the government 
also has an interest in keeping people employed.  So the choice 
for individuals, for a health care package, is not an independent 
aim but is instrumental in giving insurance companies 
incentives to work more efficiently. 
In the United States, the ACA gives much space for 
employers and insurance companies to design important 
elements of how healthcare is delivered to employees.  The 
federal government provides the underlying scheme for health 
benefits to be received by most Americans, but significant 
latitude remains for insurance companies and employers to 
operate within that system.  Individual states have taken 
different tactics regarding their involvement with the ACA 
scheme.  Some states have set up their own health insurance 
marketplaces, while others have not.  Also, some states have 
accepted the Medicaid expansion contemplated by the ACA, 
 
 424.  See The At-Will Presumption And Exceptions To The Rule, NAT’L CONF. OF 
ST. LEGIS., http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-
overview.aspx (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (intimating that employment is “presumed” 
to be at-will everywhere in the United States except Montana, which is in stark 
contrast to almost everywhere else in the world where employers can only fire people 
for cause). 
 425.  See infra Part III(e). 
 426.  See id.  
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while others have not.  So there is significant variability as far 
as the health care benefits offered to Americans in different 
parts of the country.  So whereas the minimum package of 
health benefits is defined by the statute in the Netherlands, 
statutory obligations to provide essential health benefits under 
the ACA vary greatly based on the status of the plan 
(grandfathered vs. non-grandfathered), size of the employer 
(large or small), and the manner in which the health plan is 
funded (self-funded or insured).  Apart from all these differences, 
health care does provide an important role for private actors in 
both countries, especially beyond what minimum duties are 
defined by statute. 
The American system is not completely without rules for 
how private actors like employers engage in the benefit system, 
but such involvement is through more indirect means such as 
through the reasonable accommodation provisions of the ADA or 
application of unpaid sick leave through the FMLA. 427  These 
indirect means include prohibitions on risk selection through 
outlawing preexisting conditions exclusions,428 the possibility 
that health insurance works retroactively for a person, the 
definition of basic provisions of the package, controlled 
contributions, and subsidies for lower income individuals for 
healthcare insurance.So the private market has been heavily 
regulated, but still there are incentives for the actors to take 
their responsibilities seriously. 
With regard to occupational pensions, employers and 
employee organizations play a sizable role in both countries.  
They have significant latitude in how to design their retirement 
plan schemes.  However, the Dutch authorities supervise the 
funds more strictly in order to avoid employer bankruptcy or the 
situation where funds can no longer meet promised obligations.  
Dutch supervisory bodies even require funds to cut back on 
benefits to right the pension ship.  Although the United States 
 
 427.  See Disability Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/disability.cfm (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (outlining 
the various protections U.S. workers have when it comes to work reinstatement 
under the disability law); see also The Family and Medical Leave Act, supra note 110 
(specifying that it is only in very rare circumstances that someone with taking leave 
for medical reasons would be denied reinstatement by an employer under the 
FMLA). 
 428.  See The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), U.S. 
DEP’T OF LABOR (last visited Oct. 12, 2014), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/newsroom/fshipaa.html (curbing risk selection concerns by 
severely limiting the possibilities of people being screened out for pre-existing 
medical conditions). 
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has pension insurance for defined benefit plans that become 
financially distressed under the scheme set up by the federal 
PBGC, there is no protection for private-sector defined 
contribution plans (like 401(k) plans), nor for public employee 
pension plans on the state level.  As a result, there are 
significant continuing problems with assuring adequate 
retirement security for employees with these types of pension 
plans.  And even for those employees covered by the PBGC, 
because so many plans became distressed during the global 
recession, the PBGC is significantly underfunded given all of the 
terminated single and multiemployer pension plans. 
B. EXTENT OF OCCUPATIONALLY-BASED BENEFIT SYSTEMS 
A second important difference between the Dutch and 
American social protection benefit systems is the extent of the 
two countries’ protection of workers through non-government 
actors.  Taking employer-based benefit systems into account, the 
picture changes considerably.  Although the Netherlands has an 
important occupational-based benefit scheme for retirement 
security, the relative significance of the voluntarily-adopted, 
employer-sponsored schemes for all types of benefits (pensions 
and welfare) in the United States is much larger.  This is 
because meaningful national sickness and health programs are 
mostly lacking in the United States as described above.  Sick 
pay, retirement, health insurance, and disability are regulated 
to a much larger extent in the Netherlands. 
In the Netherlands, private actors (in particular the 
employers’ and employees’ organizations) were removed from the 
administration of the public schemes.  Insofar as private actors 
are involved, in particular the insurance companies in health 
care and employers in sick pay, they have to bear the costs of the 
decisions themselves; in that, the statutory acts specifically 
define the rights and obligations of the covered persons and of 
the private actors.  By these rules, the legislature maintains its 
constitutional responsibility for the basic protection in these 
areas.  For occupational pensions, there is more room for the 
non-public actors to organize protection, but even here there is 
public responsibility present as witnessed by the promotion of 
development of these schemes, the protections against fund 
deficits, and the influence on the contents of schemes by the 
rules on tax deductions.  Unlike the Netherlands, tax subsidies 
are largely unconditional in the United States, so long as plan 
qualification requirements are met. 
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A voluntary occupational scheme necessarily entails 
inequalities and exclusions of particular groups, gaps in 
coverage, and prohibitively expensive coverage for some.429  We 
see this phenomenon in both countries.430  In the Netherlands, 
there are, however, mechanisms that exist for extending the 
occupational system, as we have seen in the section on the 
retirement pensions.  For example, employers and employees 
can ask the minister to extend a scheme for the whole sector, 
thus including all employers.  In the United States, similar 
benefit mechanisms exist under the ACA for the provisions of 
health care with regard to how the federal government 
intervenes in shaping how employer-sponsored health insurance 
schemes must operate. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTRY COMPARISONS 
Taking all of these comparisons into account can enlarge the 
domain of the discussion.  What type of social protection benefits 
should a country provide and to what extent should they be 
organized and regulated by the federal government, state, or 
non-governmental actor?  Does the chosen approach provide for 
sufficient coverage for most of the population?  If not, should 
existing social protection be supplemented by additional 
employer-based or private schemes? 
If such benefits are to be defined by legislation, how is it 
best to ensure that dedicated funds are used adequately, and is 
this possible to do by giving particular actors (e.g., private vs. 
public actors or national vs. local actors) responsibility?  To some 
extent, this limits their freedom, but since some of the schemes 
are subsidized by taxes, there may be justification for this 
approach. 
A final set of questions is that if social protection schemes 
are to be increasingly organized by employers, what then is the 
role of the various levels of government, especially if the 
government subsidizes these provisions (e.g., by tax subsidies) or 
requires certain minimal conditions by statute?  Shouldn’t such 
 
 429.  For instance, not everyone is covered. Some pension funds are more fully-
funded than others and have more generous pensions. Self-employed persons do not 
have an employer who takes the employer’s share of the contributions; for them 
pension plans are difficult to afford. 
 430.  Thus some Dutch pension funds had to reduce the pensions, whereas others 
did not, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5b480ba4-0ee7-11e2-9343-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz3J3JqFfIS (last visited 14 November 2014) (“454: Total 
number of Dutch pension funds; 81: Number of Dutch funds likely to cut pensions.”). 
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financial involvement mean that inequalities are diminished and 
access guaranteed as a condition of receiving such subsidies as 
opposed to promoting additional income inequality among 
citizens?431  Shouldn’t federal and local laws be written to 
require universal access and equal economic opportunity? 
VI. OF FEDERALISM AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES: 
PRELIMINARY PROPOSALS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY SOCIAL PROTECTION 
SYSTEMS 
Although the United States introduced the term “social 
security,” it did not really influence the meaning that this term 
has since acquired in European countries.  In the United States, 
the term is limited to old age, survivors and disability benefits; 
in the Dutch system it covers, like in other European countries, 
many more risks; there is no strict definition of the term, but 
usually commentators mention the list of risks covered by ILO 
Convention 102.432  The different approach reflects the 
responsibility various countries have taken upon their shoulders 
for social protection benefits.  In the Netherlands, the 
government has a constitutional responsibility for the welfare of 
the population;433 in the United States, no such express 
constitutional provision exists434 and such social protection is 
considered more of a moral imperative than a legal one. 
Of course, countries are free to design their own benefit 
systems how they see fit and, moreover, systems have to fit into 
the particular country’s culture, so copying foreign systems is 
often not possible or recommended.  However, based on the 
foregoing analysis, we can propose a non-ideological discussion 
 
 431.  See Qualified Retirement Plans, RAYMOND JAMES, 
http://www.raymondjames.com/personal_investing/solutions_small_business_qualifie
d_retirement_plans.htm (last visited Oct. 12, 2014) (analyzing a variety of plan 
choices and how easy it is for highly compensated employees to skirt the system and 
favor themselves—using the SIMPLE IRA example because it is not subject to non-
discrimination tests or top-heavy rules, which allows highly compensated people 
unfettered ability to defer as much as they want). 
 432.  The ILO Social Security (Minimum Standards) Convention 1952 (No. 102), 
ILO (Aug. 12, 
2012),http://www.ilo.org/secsoc/areasofwork/legaladvice/WCMS_205340/langen/index.
htm. 
 433.  Art. 20 Gw.  
 434.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (refusing to apply notion 
of welfare benefits as a form of constitutional property right to Social Security 
disability insurance benefits). 
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by the relevant policymakers and academics over whether social 
protection schemes provided to the American and Dutch 
populations are objectively sufficient. 
The term “sufficient” is, of course, a difficult one.  However, 
the Committee of Social Rights, supervising the European Social 
Charter, has developed a definition that may be very useful for 
this purpose.  According to this Committee, a subsistence income 
should, in principle, amount to at least 50% of the country’s net 
median equalized household income per adult.435  Of course, the 
United States is not bound by the European Social Charter, but 
because there is no other general basic global minimum 
standard, it is very useful to take this standard as our departure 
point. 
It should not be surprising to any knowledgeable observer 
that the United States system does not guarantee this minimal 
subsistence income.  After all, for those benefits where there is 
federal protection—old age, survivors, disability, and healthcare 
for some—there are significant gaps in the persons protected 
and the level of benefit is generally low.  For instance, consider 
that American Social Security only provides less than 50% 
replacement income and people who live on Social Security alone 
for retirement income are generally living at or near the poverty 
level.436  For disability benefits under Social Security, sickness 
benefits, and unemployment compensation, it is even much 
clearer that a comprehensive protection is lacking for most 
American citizens and that the recommended benefits protection 
is not nearly reached. 
In the Netherlands, on the other hand, the general benefit 
rate is—unless in case of partial disability—70% of the previous 
wage.437  For those having a wage at or slightly above the 
minimum wage state subsistence, benefits provide for a 
guaranteed subsistence income.  This is around $20,000 a year, 
whereas the median income is $41,490.438 
 
 435.  EUROPEAN COMMITTEE OF SOCIAL RIGHTS, EUROPEAN SOCIAL CHARTER: 
CONCLUSIONS XVII-1, 177 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). The 
Committee used this definition in its assessment of country schemes without 
publishing underlying papers discussing how the standard was developed. 
 436.  See Stephen Gross et al, Actuarial Note Number 155, Replacement Rates for 
Retirees: What Makes Sense for Planning and Evaluation?, SSA, 3-5 (July 2014), 
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/NOTES/.../note 155.pdf; see also Economic Security for 
Seniors: Fact Sheet, NCOA (Feb. 19, 2015, 3:30PM), http://www.ncoa.org/press-
room/fact-sheets/economic-security-for. 
 437.  Art. 59 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 438.  Hoe Hoog is het minimumloon?, RIJKSOVERHEID 
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The preceding analysis shows that within the United 
States, a discussion must be started as to whether the present 
social protection scheme is satisfactory for most Americans.  At 
the very least, we can conclude based on this analysis that 
additional social protection benefits in the United States would 
alleviate the financial uncertainty that many retired, sick, and 
unemployed Americans face on a daily basis. 
The question of a sufficiently high benefit should not focus 
only at the subsistence level, but also on whether it is an 
adequate replacement of lost income.  After all, risks may 
materialize at any moment and for any person.  Isn’t it, 
therefore, a more modern and humane approach that persons 
are given, in cases of such uncertainty, benefit compensation 
through which they can maintain their standard of living and 
find a way to adjust to their new situation?  For this purpose, a 
certain income replacement ratio is desirable.  Of course, this 
idea has already been generally accepted in the United States, 
but mainly to the extent that employers voluntarily make such 
arrangements based on their own perceived self-interest and 
perhaps in a manner that is beyond their core competencies.  It 
seems unacceptable to us that an individual’s fate depends so 
much on the choice of his or her employer when that employer 
does not have a fiduciary duty to do what is the best interest of 
the employee in most situations.  We believe strongly that there 
should be a general, public interest in ensuring a minimum level 
of benefit replacement ratio for uncertain times in a person’s life.  
We base this conclusion on the fundamental human rights 
notion that all individuals have equal worth and dignity, and the 
government respects individual dignity by making sufficient 
provision for their well-being in vulnerable times. 
The necessary social protection benefit standards have 
already been developed by the International Labour 
Organization and the Council of Europe.  These vary, according 
to the instrument used, and there is some variation in the 
instrument.  The lowest post Second World War standards can 
be found in ILO Convention 102, and these start from 40% of the 
previous income, depending on the benefit concerned.  Note that 
these standards have been raised in later instruments and have 
a global meaning.  Developing countries should also be able to 
ratify this instrument. 
 
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/minimumloon/vraag-en-antwoord/hoe-hoog-
is-het-minimumloon.html (last visited May 31, 2015). 
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Taking as a standard that 50% of the average individual 
income has to be compensated through social protection benefits 
is a reasonable starting point.439  After all, this proposed 
standard still means an important reduction for the income of 
most individuals.  In the American system, such income 
replacement by benefit schemes is currently not guaranteed, 
though Social Security provides such benefits for most citizens.  
However, for sickness, disability, and unemployment benefits, 
such guarantee is lacking in the United States and must be 
addressed. 
For its part, the Netherlands has a problem with reaching 
this level of income replacement for the partially disabled, since 
the Act’s approach in which persons are activated to go back to 
work has led to levels of benefit that do not meet these 
standards.  As we have seen in Section III.B, the claimant who, 
upon expiration of his wage-related benefit, does not satisfy the 
condition that she earns at least 50% of the person’s remaining 
earning capacity is eligible for a low benefit.  In the case of full 
disability, this is 70% of the statutory minimum wage.440  In 
cases of partial disability, the level depends on the incapacity 
rate.441  Persons who are incapacitated to a level of less than 
35% are not eligible for a benefit.442 
In both countries, we see that levels below the national 
government (i.e., regional authorities, state or local level 
governments, employers, or insurance companies) are granted 
responsibility to arrange social protection.  In the United States, 
this dynamic has been in place for many years, and especially 
since the enactment of ERISA in 1974, which provides tax 
incentives for the voluntary creation of employer-sponsored 
pension and welfare benefit plans.  Moreover, in the area of 
healthcare, new obligations introduced under the ACA have 
placed additional regulatory burdens on states, employers, and 
insurance companies. 
In the Netherlands, the shift of responsibilities to actors 
others than public authorities is a more recent development.443  
 
 439.  See European Committee of Social Rights, European Social Charter: 
Conclusions 2004, Vol. 1 at 107 (July 2004), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/socialcharter/conclusions/Year/2004Vol1_en.pdf 
(discussing poverty threshold). 
 440.  Art. 62 WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  Art. 61(6) WIA (The New Disability Act). 
 443.  Although in the past they were involved in the benefit administration, so it 
is not so new development. However, having the full responsibility by bearing the 
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Indeed, important and interesting differences exist between the 
American and Dutch approaches.  There appears to be more 
distrust in the Netherlands in providing subsidies/benefits to 
lower level public authorities or organizations, as it is feared 
that funds are spent not as efficiently as possible if the 
organization that makes the decisions does not bear the expense 
for these.  Instead, there is indeed a tendency to decentralize 
benefit administration since lower level bodies, whether 
employers or insurance companies, know better the local 
conditions and problems of their specific part of the country.  
Under this approach, these actors have to bear the costs 
themselves (local governments receive a lump sum for their 
tasks) and can keep the money they gain by employing efficient 
measures.  However, the national legislation defines the basic 
principles and the framework for such benefit spending, and 
thus ensures that the claims of beneficiaries are dealt with 
according to the national legislation. 
When the law gives employers responsibilities for 
compensation, as is the case with sick pay in the Netherlands, 
the law defines the obligations in a general sense and makes 
such benefits compulsory for all employers.  So the role of the 
employers and sickness insurance companies is to take over 
public tasks in the way the government wants.  In addition to 
this, they can still provide voluntary benefits. 
In sum, in both the United States and the Netherlands, 
regional authorities (the states and municipalities), employers, 
and insurance companies are given a responsibility that 
traditionally has been a public one.  To ensure consistency and 
uniformity of benefit provisions through both countries, it is 
critical that legislation provides for the basic rules and 
principles in order to realize a minimum income, a decent 
income replacement, and adequate health, disability, and 
sickness benefits. 
It makes good sense to give regional authorities, employers, 
and insurance companies the task of benefit provision, as they 
are closer to the persons concerned, and can better adjust 
conditions, benefits, and supervision of such benefits to have the 
maximum impact.  Insofar as there is concern regarding 
ensuring minimum benefit standards, however, statutory 
federal/national provisions are necessary to ensure equal 
treatment, access, uniform coverage, and sufficient level of 
 
costs of benefits is a new development. 
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benefits for all individuals. 
We now recommend that future discussions regarding the 
responsibilities for, and the contents of, social protection benefit 
systems take place in the light of the division of tasks between 
the federal/national state and others (local government, private 
companies, and employers).  We recommend first that national 
legislation define the minimum protection to be guaranteed to 
all and that the federal/national level undertakes the burden of 
enforcing these protections.  Above, we mentioned subsistence 
for all at the level of 50% of the median wage and, as a second, 
higher ambition, 50% of the individual’s last, previous wage.  
Both are minimum benefits only and, of course, more generous 
benefits can always be contemplated. 
Secondly, it is relevant to decide which public or private 
actors should arrange this minimum provision of benefits.  The 
minimal benefit level should be regulated at the national/federal 
level and applicable for all workers (and residents, in any case 
where health care is concerned). However, applying principles of 
federalism or subsidiarity,444 implementation should be done by 
those most in touch with the persons being covered.  That means 
that we suggest that benefit implementation, depending on the 
type of benefit, be done at the regional and local level by regional 
authorities, municipalities, employers, and insurance companies.  
So this may mean that more benefit-related statutory duties 
become applicable to private actors in the United States, where 
they have to realize the minimum protection deemed necessary 
by the federal government. 
Apart from the behavior of non-public actors, benefit 
schemes must be better regulated in order to protect the 
interests of the insured.  For this purpose, we propose that a 
fiduciary duty be applied to benefit administrators’ conduct.445  
Employers and insurance companies tend to be self-interested 
and conflicted when providing benefits.446  For this reason, we 
recommend that national legislation be passed in both countries 
that requires employers and insurance companies that provide 
benefits to workers and individuals to follow fiduciary standards 
 
 444.  For the Netherlands, the term “federalism” is less appropriate; however, the 
concept is still very applicable. 
 445.  This fiduciary standard is borrowed from ERISA law. See 29 U.S.C. 1104 
(2012) (setting out fiduciary standards of loyalty and care for ERISA fiduciaries). 
 446.  The U.S. Supreme Court has discussed these structural conflicts of interest 
in denial of benefit cases. See Metropolitan Life v. Glenn, 128 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 
(2008) (noting the inherently conflicted nature of an employer fiduciary who both 
decides benefit claims and pays for granted benefit claims). 
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of loyalty and care.  Such a system is already in place with 
regard to ERISA plans in the United States, and so we seek the 
expansion of such fiduciary duties to the provision of all social 
protection benefits to all persons.  This approach recognizes the 
dignity and worth of all individuals, especially during times of 
uncertainty, and will lead to important protections against 
abuse, discrimination, and insolvency.  The concept of fiduciary 
standard does not replace current law, but supplements these 
standards.  This is appropriate, as even when statutory rules 
and concepts apply, the self-interest of organizations or 
employers can conflict with individual interests.  As we have 
seen, eliminating self-interest is explicitly desired by the Dutch 
legislature, but overall criteria are still missing.  The concept of 
fiduciary standards may be very useful to improve Dutch social 
protection law in this regard. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this article has been to introduce a new 
approach to social protection benefit provision through an 
analysis and comparison of two of the advanced benefit systems 
in the world.  Both the Dutch and American examples teach us 
that meaningful social benefit protection is possible, consistent, 
and necessary within market-based societies. 
Our recommendation is that advanced-market societies 
start a discussion on social protection benefits based on the dual 
principles of subsidiarity and fiduciary duty.  Subsidiarity 
provides that the national/federal government should provide 
the principles and minimal framework for benefit provision, 
while regional authorities, employers, and insurance companies 
should be given freedom, and the duty, to implement the 
underlying schemes to meet the challenges of the local situation.  
However, to constrain the sometime self-interested and 
conflicted motives of employers and insurance companies in the 
benefits system, we also suggest that countries adopt, at the 
national level, fiduciary duties of loyalty and care to protect 
against abuse, discrimination, and arbitrary action in the 
provision of such benefits.  In addition, these principles should 
also be applied to employer-sponsored schemes in both countries, 
to the extent that such duties do not already exist. 
 We hope, and believe, that through the construction of such 
a social benefit system, countries can guarantee a minimal level 
of benefit protection that will help their citizens negotiate 
difficult times during retirement, disability, sickness, injury, and 
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unemployment.  In turn, the “benefit” of such a system will be 
the recognition of the dignity and self-worth of all individuals, 
which is a non-ideological goal that we can all embrace. 
